Cold Warrior Abroad : The Foreign Missions of Vice President Richard Nixon by Smith, Brenan
  
Cold Warrior Abroad: 
The Foreign Missions of Vice President Richard Nixon 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of Graduate Studies and Research  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Master of Arts 
In the Department of History  
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
 
 
 
By Brenan R.R. Smith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Brenan Smith, September 2012.  All rights reserved. 
i 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree from 
the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of the University may make it freely 
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, 
in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who 
supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the 
College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or 
use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University 
of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
Cold Warrior Abroad was exclusively created to meet the thesis and/or exhibition requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Saskatchewan. Reference in this thesis to 
any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, 
or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favouring by the 
University of Saskatchewan. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not state 
or reflect those of the University of Saskatchewan, and shall not be used for advertising or 
product endorsement purposes. 
 
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole or part 
should be addressed to: 
 
 
Head of the Department of History 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 From 1953-1961, Richard Nixon served as Dwight Eisenhower’s vice president.  As vice 
president, Nixon represented the United States and the Eisenhower administration on several 
foreign missions.  Cold Warrior Abroad studies four of these missions in order to discern 
Nixon’s development as a statesman, and his understanding of, and impact on Eisenhower’s 
foreign policies.  Through careful examination of archival sources, this thesis will reveal the 
significant role Nixon came to play in the alteration, execution, and sometimes formation of 
Eisenhower’s foreign policies in the regions the vice president visited. 
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Introduction 
When he died in 1994, President Richard Nixon was known as a veteran of foreign affairs 
and an elder statesman.  At the outset of his vice presidency in 1953, however, Nixon had very 
little diplomatic experience.
1
  Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower worked to expand the 
role of the vice president in foreign affairs, a perception grew that Nixon had contributed little of 
substance to U.S. foreign policy.
2
  Indeed, in 1960, when a journalist asked the president for a 
single example of Nixon’s impact on American foreign policy, he responded impatiently, “If you 
give me a week, I might think of one.”3   
Despite Eisenhower’s memory lapse, Vice President Nixon travelled to over 50 nations 
as a representative of the United States and played an important part in the development of U.S. 
foreign relations during the period from 1953 to 1961.  Based mainly on newly declassified 
archival records, this thesis analyses Nixon’s role in four international missions: to Asia and the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Soviet Union.  In 1953, Nixon visited several 
countries in Asia and the Middle East, acting as a diplomat and intelligence gatherer while 
promoting the administration’s containment policies and its anti-Communist ideology.  In 1957, 
the vice president toured nations in Africa north of the equator in order to gauge the alignment of 
those nations and to find ways in which America might increase its standing in the area. In 1958, 
Nixon travelled to several Latin American nations to gather information and demonstrate the 
Eisenhower administration’s support of democratically elected governments. Finally, in 1959, 
                                                          
1
 Nixon had played a role in the 1947 Herter Committee’s mission to Europe, essentially gauging the necessity of 
the Marshall Plan, but held little power or attention. 
2
 Elliot L. Watson, “America in Asia:  Vice President Nixon’s Forgotten Trip to Ceylon,” Foreign Policy Journal  (May 
1, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/05/01/america-in-asia-vice-president-nixons-forgotten-trip-
to-ceylon/ (Accessed April 25, 2012).  Watson mentions how Eisenhower attempted to expand the role of the Vice 
President from its traditionally quite “insignificant” position. 
3
 President’s News Conference, August 24, 1960, Box 21, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary:  Records 1952-1961, 
Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDEL). 
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Nixon visited the U.S.S.R. on a mission with multiple objectives:  intelligence gathering, 
psychological warfare, and diplomacy.  During all of these missions, Nixon developed as a 
statesman and made significant contributions to the foreign policy goals of the Eisenhower 
administration.   
The containment of Communism, typically of Soviet origin, was an integral element of 
the foreign policies of most American presidents during the Cold War.  George F. Kennan’s 
1946 “Long Telegram,” one of the earliest endorsements for containment, portrays the Soviet 
Union as “committed fanatically” to undermining, disrupting, or destroying, almost every 
conceivable element of American society.
4
  In a broad sense, containment was interpreted by 
American statesmen as being “a global American security mission” which “charged America 
with combating Soviet pressures for the indefinite future all around a vast periphery.”5  Kennan’s 
telegram allows for the extrapolation of some general points and advice for containing the Soviet 
Union: the United States needed to be able, and demonstrate willingness to, militarily overmatch 
the U.S.S.R. when necessary; the “Western World” had to remain strong and united; over time, 
the grip of the Soviet leadership on its people would likely start to wane, and thus only over the 
long-term would victory be possible; “intelligent and constructive” psychological warfare ought 
to be enacted by the Western world.
6
  While containment was first adopted under the Truman 
                                                          
4
 Telegram, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946, Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union,  S. Everett Gleason, Rogers P. 
Churchill, William Slany, and  Jerome H. Perlmutter eds. (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1969), 706, 
(FRUS hereafter).  Kennan later adapted this telegram for his 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, in which he more 
directly, and publically (though anonymously) advocated containment with the warning that,  “it is clear that the 
main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm 
and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”  See, X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign 
Affairs 25, (July 1947), 575.   Kennan’s impact on the U.S.’s actions in the Cold War is still a topic of debate.  See 
Scott Lewis and Kaeten Mistry, “Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy and Political Warfare in the 
Early Cold War, 1946–1950,” Diplomatic History 33, No. 1 (January 2009), 39-43. 
5
 Henry Kissinger, “Reflections on Containment,” Foreign Affairs 73, No. 3 (May-June, 1994), 115, 121. 
6
 Kennan to Secretary of State, February 22, 1946, FRUS 1946, 707-708. 
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administration, its form and application was more clearly developed and expressed in the 
Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” policy. 
Integral to understanding a strong motivation for all of Nixon’s missions is at least a 
basic overview of Eisenhower’s “New Look,” strategy/policy, laid out in NSC 162/2.  As John 
Lewis Gaddis and Saki Dockrill explain, the New Look focused on alliances or mutual/collective 
security, the build-up of America’s nuclear arsenal, psychological warfare, covert operations, 
and diplomacy, all in the hopes of undermining and eventually defeating the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War, while also maintaining a sound domestic economy.
7
  The New Look provides both the 
context for Nixon’s missions and many of the actions he took and recommendations he made 
during and after them.  The New Look was intended to help avoid open conflict with the Soviet 
Union even as it weakened international Communism, while simultaneously advancing 
American interests, (usually referred to in NSC 162 as the interests of the “Free World”), within 
a sound economic structure designed to allow for maximum defence rather than offence.
8
  
Maintaining superiority in the realm of nuclear weapons was also a key element of the New 
Look.
9
  Finally, the New Look was a long term plan, in that it considered the slackening of 
“revolutionary zeal,” the takeover of “managerial and bureaucratic interests,” and “popular 
pressures for consumption goods” as the most likely factors which would cause the Soviet Union 
                                                          
7
 James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War:  U.S. Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations (New York:  I.B. 
Tauris, 2010), 90; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment:  A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005), 145-147; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look 
National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 189. 
8
 NSC 162 refers to a “sound economy,” maintaining the “lowest feasible costs” for deterrence and retaliation but 
the document never refers to an open and initial offensive against the Soviets or Communist Chinese.  See ”NSC 
162/2” in FRUS, 1952-1954. Volume II, Part One, National Security Affairs, William Z. Slany, Lisle A. Rose, and Neal 
H. Petersen eds. (Washington:  United States Government Printing Office, 1984), 592.  
9
 “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National Security Affairs, 582.  The emphasis on “massive retaliatory damage by offensive 
striking power” seems to be a clear indicator of the importance of nuclear weapons. 
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to collapse.
10
  By keeping in mind these basic elements of containment and the New Look, 
examinations of Nixon’s missions and their place within Eisenhower’s foreign policy result in 
interesting conclusions. 
The current historiography on Richard Nixon, also known as “Nixonography,” focuses 
mostly on his presidency.  This historiography contains a wide variety of approaches, including 
biographies, psycho-personal analyses, Watergate centred works, foreign policy evaluations, and 
domestic studies.
11
  Although some of these works touch on Nixon’s vice presidency, few of 
them analyse his foreign missions in any depth or detail.
12
  Thus, significant gaps exist in the 
current historiography on Nixon. 
                                                          
10
 “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National Security Affairs, 581. 
11
 C.L. Sulzberger claimed that until the time nearing Nixon’s death, dislike of the former president had meant a 
lack of sufficient analysis in historical works.  See The World and Richard Nixon (New York:  Prentice Hall, 1987), xi-
xiii, 192-194.  Of biographies, see Conrad Black, The Invincible Quest:  The Life of Richard Milhous Nixon (Toronto:  
McClelland and Stewart, 2007), and Elizabeth Drew, Richard M. Nixon:  The American Presidents Series:  The 37
th
 
President, 1969-1974 (New York:  Times Books, 2007). For psycho-personal analyses see Anthony Summers, The 
Arrogance of Power:  The Secret World of Richard Nixon (New York:  Viking, 2000), Fawn M. Brodie, Richard Nixon:  
The Shaping of His Character (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1983), and  Vamik D. Volkan, Norman 
Itzkowitz, and Andrew W. Dod, Richard Nixon:  A Psychobiography (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1997), 
73-74.  As to Watergate centred works, please see Stanley Kutler, The Wars of Watergate:  The Last Crisis of 
Richard Nixon (New York:  Knopf, 1990), and Theodore H. White, Breach of Faith:  The Fall of Richard Nixon (New 
York:  Dell Publishing Company, 1976).  With regard to foreign policy evaluations, see Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, 
and U.S. Foreign Policy Making:  The Machinery of Crisis (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Jussi 
M. Hanhimäki, “‘Dr. Kissinger’ or ‘Mr. Henry’? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting,” Diplomatic History 27, 
No. 5 (November 2003):  638-645.  See also Jeffrey Kimball, “H-Diplo Article Commentary: Kimball on Hanhimäki 
(historiographical),” http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/Kimball-Hanhimaki.pdf (Accessed July 17, 2011), 1-
2, and his Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 1998), and The Vietnam War Files:  
Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence:  University Press of Kansas, 2004).  On domestic 
studies see Dean Kotlowski, Nixon’s Civil Rights:  Politics, Principle, and Policy (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 2001), and Frank Kusch, “Nixon’s Loyalists:  Inside the War for White House, 1972,” (PhD diss., University of 
Saskatchewan, 2010). 
12
 See, for example, Stephen Ambrose, Nixon:  The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962 (New York:  Simon and 
Schuster, 1987, and James H.  Meriwether, “A Torrent Overrunning Everything: Africa and the Eisenhower 
Administration,” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, Kathryn 
C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns eds., (Oxford:  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Incorporated, 2006).  For a notable 
exception to the criticism above, see Watson, “America in Asia:  Vice President Nixon’s Forgotten Trip to Ceylon.”  
Watson’s work accomplishes a similar goal to this thesis in that it sheds light on Nixon’s experiences abroad as vice 
president.  However, as the title makes clear, Watson’s work is limited to one country during one mission. 
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Some doctoral dissertations have sought to address these gaps.  Paul Kengor’s thesis 
focuses on the role of the vice president and the office of the vice presidency in foreign policy 
through a number of case studies.  Unfortunately, though, Kengor views Nixon backwards, 
examining his vice presidency in light of his later actions as president.
13
  Kengor does provide 
important perspectives and theories on how Nixon functioned as a kind of foreign policy tool and 
advisor while vice president.
14
  Yet, his focus is primarily on recounting events rather than 
analysing Vice President Nixon’s role as a statesman or the implications of Nixon’s role in the 
development of Eisenhower’s foreign policies.15 
 Like Kengor, Anthony Maravillas views Nixon through a retrospective lens; indeed, he 
labels the vice presidency an “apprenticeship.”16  Maravillas rarely portrays Nixon’s actions as of 
immediate import, but rather only as contributions to the education of a future president.
17
  
Although Maravillas recognizes that Vice President Nixon played an active role in influencing 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy, he does not analyze the immediate effects or impact of this 
influence.
18
   
Benjamin Goldberg’s dissertation also focuses on Nixon’s experience as vice president.  
One of the main objectives of Goldberg’s dissertation is to establish and analyse the importance 
of the complex mentor-protégé relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and 
                                                          
13
 Paul Kengor states that examining Nixon’s vice presidency makes Nixon’s transformation into a “foreign policy 
animal” and a president focused on foreign policy “abundantly clear.”  See “The Role of the Vice President in 
Foreign Policy:  Lessons Learned and Policy Insights,” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1997), 61. 
14
 Kengor argues that Nixon would perform his duty as he believed was warranted, and then offer and push his 
opinions to the influential players in the administration.  See “Role of the Vice President,” 85-86. 
15
 Kengor, “Role of the Vice President,” 90-95. 
16
 Anthony Rama Maravillas, “Nixon in the Fifties,” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2001), vi.  
17
 Maravillas argues that Nixon’s foreign missions taught “very important lessons for the would-be president.”  See 
“Nixon in the Fifties,” 202. 
18
 Maravillas, “Nixon in the Fifties,” 166-167, 202. 
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Vice President Nixon.
19
  The essential strength of Goldberg’s work is that his analysis is 
primarily focused on the development of Nixon’s position and attitude within the Eisenhower 
administration.
20
  But the weakness of the dissertation is that his main objectives do not allow for 
sufficient analysis of Nixon’s foreign missions. 
In contrast, this thesis will demonstrate Nixon’s growth as a statesman and how his 
foreign missions contributed to the development of Eisenhower’s foreign policies.  Increasing 
scholarly attention has been given to the Eisenhower administration’s Cold War policies in 
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.
21
  The Eisenhower administration 
often struggled with the complexities involved with this truly global challenge.
22
  The main 
contribution of this thesis with respect to the expanding literature on Eisenhower’s foreign 
policies will be to display Nixon’s role in the development of the Eisenhower administration’s 
Cold War strategy.  This thesis will also display Nixon’s development as a statesman by arguing 
that Nixon’s recommendations and his criticisms of Eisenhower’s policies were indicative of his 
growing pragmatism and greater sophistication as a statesman.  
                                                          
19
 Benjamin Goldberg, “The Vice Presidency of Richard Nixon:  One Man’s Quest for National Respect, an 
International Reputation, and the Presidency,” (PhD diss., College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1998), 75-76. 
20
 Goldberg details Nixon’s reactions to certain figures on his 1953 mission and the impact these had on how he 
conducted himself within the administration.  However, analysis of the mission and actual implications of some of 
the conversations is limited.  See “One Man’s Quest,” 121-124, 126. 
21
 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman focus primarily on Eisenhower’s European policies, and while they 
acknowledge that Eisenhower paid an increasing amount of attention to Africa, Asia, and Latin America during his 
time as president, theirs is certainly a “Europe first” history.  See Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, 
Waging Peace:  How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 
252-254.  It ought be acknowledged that Immerman has focused on Vietnam, with Fred I. Greenstein in ”What Did 
Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception,” Journal of American History 79, No. 2 
(September 1992), 580-585; and with George C. Herring in “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: "The Day We 
Didn't Go to War" Revisited,” Journal of American History 71, No. 2 (September 1984), 349.  Both articles mention 
Nixon but do not analyse his contributions.  Nixon was sent on missions to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and 
considerable resources were expended not only on the missions themselves but often later on aid to many of the 
nations therein.  Therefore, examination of any correlation between Nixon’s missions and subsequent increases in 
aid seems warranted.  For Nixon’s visits at least appearing to precede aid increases, see Dockrill, Eisenhower’s 
New-Look, 175, 229. 
22
 David L. Anderson, “The Devil Is in the Details:  Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Third World,” The Eisenhower 
Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, 272-275. 
7 
 
Careful analysis of Richard Nixon’s role in these international missions reveals a man 
attempting to accomplish his task as best he could, taking into consideration his interpretation of 
the intent of Eisenhower’s Cold War policies.  While certainly ambitious, Nixon’s actions abroad 
indicate that strong motivators for him were to assist, enhance, and otherwise attempt to support 
the administration’s goals as he perceived them.  Although the vice president was supportive of 
Eisenhower’s New Look containment strategy, many of his actions, reports, and 
recommendations suggest that he understood that in order to be successful, the administration 
could not simply support anti-Communism regardless of the costs.  Working within his 
understanding of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy goals, Nixon became an integral 
player in the development of these policies, and grew into a shrewd and capable statesman 
during his various international missions. 
The first chapter of this thesis examines Richard Nixon’s 1953 mission to Asia and the 
Middle East.  Of the nations which Nixon travelled to on this mission, Vietnam, Korea, India, 
Pakistan, and Iran are of special interest.  Nixon’s interactions with the leaders and 
representatives of these nations are important in that they reveal Nixon’s initial abilities as a 
statesman.  The vice president’s actions during this mission also demonstrate the Eisenhower 
administration’s strategy, namely anti-Communism, and how the New Look was to be 
implemented in the areas Nixon visited.  The second chapter focuses on Nixon’s 1957 trip to 
African nations such as Morocco, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tunisia, Liberia, and Libya.  Nixon’s 
recommendations after his African mission point to both a failure to implement the New Look in 
the region, and opportunities for containing Communism and expanding America’s influence in 
Africa and the Middle East.
23
  The third chapter centres on Nixon’s 1958 trip to several South 
                                                          
23
 “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National Security Affairs, 581-587. 
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American nations, with emphasis on Peru and Venezuela.  Through examination of Nixon’s 
recommendations and the reaction of the Eisenhower administration to the attacks on Nixon in 
Latin America, Nixon’s growing sophistication and pragmatism is made clear by means of 
contrasting those elements with the often heavy-handed and short-sighted policies of the 
Eisenhower administration in Latin America.  The fourth chapter is concerned solely with 
Nixon’s 1959 mission to the USSR.  Like the other missions, the policy of anti-Communism, the 
Eisenhower administration’s drive for influence and desire to prevail in the Cold War, are 
revealed in this chapter.  In addition, Nixon’s shrewdness as a Cold War statesman, displayed 
during his conversations with Khrushchev, is also made clear. 
Given the paucity of works that focus on Vice President Nixon’s foreign missions, this 
thesis will make an original contribution to the existing literature.  The thesis is based largely on 
newly declassified documents, found in the Dwight Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and 
the Richard Nixon Library in Yorba Linda, California.  The Nixon Library’s Pre-Presidential 
Collection and Vice Presidential Collection provide insights into Nixon’s role, observations, and 
conclusions during these foreign missions.  These collections include Nixon’s handwritten notes, 
personal messages and communique’s between Nixon, his staff, and others within the 
Eisenhower administration, as well as memoranda of conversations, reports, and briefing 
materials which reveal how Nixon went about preparing for, undertaking, and reporting on his 
missions.  Many collections from the Eisenhower Library, including various White House Office 
collections, the White House Central Files, and the records of both Dwight Eisenhower and John 
Foster Dulles, were also very useful.  These collections, which include transcripts of telephone 
conversations, internal memoranda, NSC reports, and records of meetings within the 
9 
 
administration, reveal important insights regarding the policies of the Eisenhower administration 
and the impact of Nixon’s international missions.24   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Irwin F. Gellman has also pointed out the lack of study conducted on Nixon’s vice presidency, and his conclusions 
on the usefulness of such a study using the resources from the Nixon Library lines up well with my own.  See, “The 
Richard Nixon Vice Presidency:  Research without the Nixon Manuscripts,” A Companion to Richard Nixon, Melvin 
Small ed. (Malden:  Wiley Blackwell, 2011). 
10 
 
Chapter One:  1953 Asia and the Middle East 
Nixon and the “New Look” 
 Richard Nixon’s first foreign mission as vice president commenced on October 5, 1953 
and ended on December 14 of the same year, during which he visited nineteen nations.  Nixon’s 
objectives during the mission were to investigate the developing situation in Indochina, reassure 
and engage American allies, court and engage neutral nations, and gauge Asian reactions and 
feelings towards Communist China.
25
  The concerns of the Eisenhower administration were put 
more bluntly in the briefing book prepared for the Vice President ahead of his visit:  “with the 
cessation of hostilities in Korea, the Communists find themselves in a strong position to expand 
their influence in the Far East.”26  During this mission, the Vice President played an important 
part in developing the Eisenhower administration’s anti-Communist policies abroad.  Close 
examinations of Nixon’s time in Korea, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Formosa, as well as Iran 
will help to explain his role towards that end.   
Nixon’s first international mission as vice president served many purposes.  In every 
nation he visited, the vice president warned against policies or actions which went against the 
Eisenhower administration’s plans for containing and defeating Communism.  In Vietnam this 
meant arguing for the French to alter their tactics, in Korea and Formosa it meant espousing 
restraint on the parts of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Shek, and in India and Iran it meant 
recommending patience and loyalty.  With each visit Nixon’s perspectives on the United States 
and the Eisenhower administration’s policies were made more apparent.  In 1953, Nixon viewed 
the anti-Communist Eisenhower administration’s policies uncritically despite their hegemonic 
                                                          
25
 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York:  Warner Books, 1978), 146. 
26
 CIA Briefing Book for the Vice President, 28 September, 1953, 1, Box 19, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, 
White House Office (hereafter WHO), National Security Council Staff:  Papers, 1948-1961, DDEL. 
11 
 
elements.
27
  Connected to this, Nixon’s enthusiasm for the New Look policies and Eisenhower 
and Dulles’s endorsement of Nixon’s conclusions based on his experiences during the mission 
are important for what they reveal about both Nixon and the administration in 1953.  At the time 
of his first mission, Richard Nixon’s mindset was one of almost unquestioning loyalty and 
adherence to the containment policies and actions of his administration.  Both the strong anti-
Communist tendencies of the Eisenhower administration and Nixon’s confidence in that 
administration’s superiority were evident during Nixon’s mission to Vietnam. 
 Nixon’s mission to Vietnam was of great significance to the Eisenhower administration.  
The focal point of much of the historiography vis-à-vis the Eisenhower administration and the 
Vietnam War has been the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the American actions which 
followed.
28
  This is problematic in that American involvement in, and concern with Indochina, 
had been escalating since Eisenhower took office.
29
  While there was certainly not a “clean slate” 
for the Eisenhower administration in 1954, there was clearly a turning point in regards to the 
level of America’s commitment.30  As David L. Anderson has shown, Eisenhower had placed a 
high priority on supporting actions against Vietnam falling to Communism while the Korean 
                                                          
27
 The New Look’s logic flows from the premise that only the United States could hold back Communist 
domination, and in order to accomplish this, the New Look states that the U.S. requires overseas bases in Europe 
and Asia.  Such bases depended on the cooperation of the country they were to be maintained only in “most 
cases.”  Thus, the New Look Policy advocated that the U.S. actively work to maintain a military presence in both 
allied, and when necessary, non-allied nations, as the “leader” of the free world.  See “NSC 162/2,” FRUS: National 
Security Affairs, 583-584. 
28
 I take as good examples Gareth Porter’s Perils of Dominance:  Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in 
Vietnam (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2005), 70-74 and Lloyd Gardner’s “America’s War in Vietnam:  
The End of Exceptionalism?” The Legacy:  The Vietnam War in the American Imagination, ed. D. Michael Shafer, 
(Boston:  Beacon Press, 1990), 12-17. 
29
 Scott A. Silverstone, Preventive War and American Democracy (New York:  Routledge, 2007) 86-87. 
30
 For the clean slate hypothesis see Edward Cuddy, “Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War. Or Mr. Eisenhower's?,” The 
Review of Politics 65, No. 4 (Autumn, 2003), 353-354.  For the hypothesis of a turning point in which the US had to 
either increase their commitment levels or risk perceived embarrassment and failure see Pierre Asselin, “The 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Conference: A revisionist critique,” Cold War History, 11, 
No. 2 (May 2011), 160-162. 
12 
 
War still raged.
31
  In 1953 the administration and its departments had the opportunity to re-
examine American involvement in Indochina and appraise both flaws in France’s approach to the 
situation and likely outcomes should the French fail to stabilise Vietnam.  A significant part of 
this re-examination was undertaken by Richard Nixon during his stop there in 1953.   
 Nixon’s mission to Vietnam and the preparations made for the mission reveal that 
American officials were well aware of the many challenges that they would likely face in the 
future, and had already committed to American involvement in Vietnam.  It is important to note 
that in 1953, French forces in Indochina still numbered almost two hundred thousand and that 
while the United States was not interested in supplying American troops, a significant amount of 
money, prestige, and credibility had already been invested.
32
  Nixon was visiting at a time when 
American involvement stood on a precipice.  Certainly America was deeply involved in the 
Vietnam situation, but at this point a willful false hope existed that the French might be able to 
stabilise the area, and thus negate the necessity for further American involvement.
33
  Indeed, the 
United States was attempting to exert more and more control over the French, going so far as to 
demand a timeline for French withdrawal.
34
  The main reason that American policy indicated 
that further involvement would be necessary should the French efforts fail was not at this point 
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neocolonialism so much as a genuine fear of growing Communist influence in the area.
35
  In 
1953 the central concern was keeping a “domino” from falling to Communism, and this was 
expressed clearly to and by Nixon.  The term “domino” here refers to the “domino theory,” 
which held that if any single nation fell to Communism, especially in Asia, it would create, much 
like a line of dominoes, a chain reaction in which all others would fall.
36
  President Eisenhower 
argued that the non-Communist world could “not afford” to allow such a chain reaction to 
occur.
37
 
 The fear of Communist influence spreading and overtaking Vietnam was at the very least 
perceived to be a legitimate threat by American officials, including Nixon.  During a meeting 
with Emperor Bao Dai, Nixon was told that without military support Vietnam would “be an 
immediate prey to the Communist enemy.”38  Whether this was simply an example of the 
emperor attempting to ensure American aid continued to come to Vietnam, the fact remains that 
Nixon’s briefings were in line with Bao Dai’s assessments, with the addendum that “all of 
Southeast Asia” would fall with Vietnam.39  This growing anxiety over Communist China’s 
perceived machinations for total dominance in Asia and “hegemony in the Western Pacific,” 
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elicited a panicked response from many in the administration.
40
  Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles went so far as to envision a Chinese invasion possibly setting off another world war.
41
  
The fear of a Communist takeover, and what such a takeover signified to the Eisenhower 
administration, guaranteed the situation in Vietnam would be difficult to resolve.  
Complicating matters was the very problematic position within the Eisenhower 
administration that held that any concessions to Communists in Vietnam would inevitably lead to 
eventual Communist takeover of Vietnam, and thus no concessions were to be made.
42
  Given 
the New Look’s emphasis on collective security, and the accompanying problem that essentially 
any single threat to an ally became a global threat meant that the Vietnam situation was one 
which would require more rather than less involvement for the Eisenhower administration.
43
  In 
promoting collective security in Vietnam, Nixon claimed that Vietnam’s struggle was one of 
global proportions which involved “all the free nations of the world” and promised that in 
resisting Communist aggression Vietnam would be aided by America.
44
  Neither Nixon nor 
Eisenhower or Dulles made unequivocal statements which pointed to the Eisenhower 
administration’s willingness to increase American commitments in Vietnam, yet many of 
Nixon’s actions during and after his time there hint at such a disposition. 
 Although there is no definitive link between Nixon’s preparation for and report on his 
mission, and the later increase in American involvement, there are indications that both the 
Eisenhower administration and Nixon assumed American involvement would not diminish in the 
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near future.  The “highlight” of Nixon’s time in Vietnam, as described by Ambassador Donald 
Heath, was an event which saw Nixon inspecting French and Vietnamese troops during combat a 
“few miles” from the front line at Lai Cac.45  While Nixon made note, both at the time and in his 
memoirs, of the many problems with the French treatment of their Vietnamese allies, he also 
recorded that problems with training and a lack of intelligence gathering plagued anti-
Communist efforts.
46
  Nixon was not a military or intelligence expert, and as such these 
criticisms may or may not have been valid, but the fact that he brought them up with General 
Navarre, the commander of French Union forces in Vietnam, suggests Nixon felt strongly 
enough about them to offend an ally.
47
  In addition to the military matters, the vice president also 
attempted to address other factors he viewed as detrimental to Vietnam’s long term survival as 
an American ally. 
Nixon had an acute interest in “solving” the problems in Vietnam, and his proposed 
solutions are important for what they signify.  Despite the fact that his solutions, such as his 
proposal to begin training anti-Communist agents out of a select group of the Chinese population 
in Vietnam in order to subvert pro-Communist agents, were often impractical, the fact that he 
devoted such time, and argued the resources required by such programs to be reasonable, 
demonstrates the level of commitment he felt the Eisenhower administration had in Vietnam.
48
  
Nixon also called for a totally revamped propaganda program for Vietnam as he posited that the 
existing program was “completely inadequate” in terms of communicating facts or in convincing 
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the Vietnamese of the benefits of working with non-Communist forces.
49
  If these plans and 
assessments were only Nixon’s, and had they only been agreed with by Ambassador Heath, it 
would be fair to dismiss such evidence as not indicating a trend towards continued or increased 
American involvement in Vietnam.
50
  However, Nixon’s evaluations were approved of by the 
Eisenhower administration. 
In his confidential report after the completion of his mission, Nixon made several points 
about U.S. involvement in Vietnam which intimated that the American presence there was not 
going to subside in the near future.  It is reasonable to conclude that since Dulles gathered a 
group of State, Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) officials on January 8, 1954, in 
order to have Nixon impart his findings to them, findings which Dulles characterised as 
“wisdom,” that Dulles was convinced Nixon’s views were credible.  When discussing Vietnam 
in particular, Nixon noted to those gathered that “we have got our money in this pot; we have got 
to stick with it,” reflecting the vice president’s view that the administration should not spend 
hundreds of millions of dollars and allow events to play out without American input.
51
   
Nixon’s recommendations to officials from multiple departments hint at but do not 
recognise the kinds of power and influence he thought were necessary for their implementation.  
Nixon stated that the necessary input would require the administration to push for France to, 
among other things, take genuine steps toward Vietnam’s legitimate independence, support a 
pro-Western leader the Vietnamese people would rally behind, implement a better and more 
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realistic training program for troops in Vietnam, and oppose negotiations with Communist 
forces.
52
  Most telling was Nixon’s conclusion that as long as Communist China continued to try 
to exert influence in Vietnam the United States would support actions there for “many, many 
years to come.”53  Thus Nixon’s recommendations argued for either exerting greater influence on 
France or becoming more involved in Vietnam in some other form.  These included attempting 
to revamp Western propaganda programs in Vietnam, which were “completely inadequate,” and 
placing pressure on the Viet Minh to negotiate a settlement which favoured Western interests 
while working to “oppress negotiation” or the desire for it on the part of the French.54  Like other 
members of the Eisenhower administration, Nixon concluded that a higher level of American 
involvement or intervention was needed in order to bring Vietnam in line with the non-
Communist world, and while no mention was made of American troops, it was clear that Nixon 
was convinced that the French needed more input and control from the Americans if the situation 
in Vietnam was to improve.   
Whereas in Vietnam Nixon had been essentially an intelligence gatherer who gave advice 
based on the information he had gained, when he travelled to Formosa (modern Taiwan), his job 
description included more diplomatic aspects.  In Formosa Nixon was met with the challenge of 
explaining the limitations of American support against Communism in tandem with gathering 
information.  Chiang Kai-Shek’s main focus was the reunification of Formosa with mainland 
China, as he saw the control of Communists in China as a temporary problem with a military 
solution.  When meeting with Formosa’s President Chiang Kai-Shek, Nixon was dealing with a 
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man whom his briefing described as believing that a third World War was “inevitable.”55  
Chiang’s tendency to make bold predictions was often focused squarely on issues involving 
mainland China.  In their first meeting, on November 9, 1953, President Chiang argued 
vociferously that the Soviet Union was using Communist China to advance aggressive actions in 
Asia in order to both expand Communist influence and to leave Communist China focused on 
foreign conflicts rather than domestic development.
56
  Chiang also maintained that while the 
Soviet Union was “clear” in its manipulation of Communist regimes toward a policy of global 
domination, the United States had no “purpose and direction” in its policies in Asia, and this 
frustrated U.S. allies.
57
  While Nixon agreed with this assessment, he also worked to dampen 
Chiang’s enthusiasm for invading China. 
Nixon’s efforts to keep Chiang’s machinations for invasion in check stemmed from the 
Eisenhower administration’s desire for peace, its current policy, and Nixon’s own appraisal of 
Formosa’s chances of success.  That the Eisenhower administration desired that Formosa should 
avoid instigating conflict with Communist China was made clear in NSC 146/2, which called for 
a build-up of Formosa’s military, economy, and government, as well as utilising the nation for 
psychological operations against Communist China.
58
  Nixon attempted to show Chiang through 
Chiang’s own plans how the preparations for war would be infeasible for many different reasons.  
Nixon was able to garner an admission from Chiang that his two plans for retaking China, either 
the crash training of 300,000 new troops over one and a half years, or a three year build-up of his 
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entire armed forces, were both dependent on significant U.S. resources, materiel, and training.
59
  
Nixon proposed that Chiang’s plans would take longer than three years to prepare, and that the 
kind of aid Chiang needed would take an equivalent amount of time to arrive and be utilised.  
The vice president pushed Chiang to consider the probability of success for an invasion in five 
years or later; Chiang admitted success was much less likely at such a time.
60
  Further proof that 
Nixon did not feel Chiang’s plans were feasible came at the end of their final interview, when 
Nixon stated that while he currently had no direct power over American actions vis-à-vis 
Chiang’s concerns, the only point he agreed with Chiang on was that the U.S. needed to clarify 
and stand by its polices in Asia.
61
  Nixon was convinced that clarification of the U.S. position 
would at least make clear to the U.S.’s allies the limits of American support. 
In Formosa Nixon was reassured by the fact that Chiang Kai-Shek knew Formosa could 
not hope to win a war with China unaided and without careful preparation; in Korea Nixon was 
tasked with dealing with Syngman Rhee, a leader who at least appeared to be enthusiastic for 
war in Korea and beyond, regardless of the risk.  Ongoing changes both within the policy of the 
Eisenhower administration as well as on the international stage meant that Nixon’s mission in 
South Korea was one of great importance.  With the recent conclusion of hostilities in the 
Korean War, South Korea’s Rhee was in a similar mindset to that of Formosa’s Chiang Kai-Shek 
in that he too foresaw a military solution to the problem of his divided nation.  The complex 
nature of the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) belies a 
simple explanation, but it is fair to state that late in 1953 the Eisenhower administration viewed 
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the ROK as at best a “rogue ally” and was convinced that the ROK required a greater deal of 
direct control than its European allies.
62
   
When considering opposing arguments on the Eisenhower administration’s standpoint on 
Korea, the importance of Nixon’s mission both to the administration and to the historiography 
becomes evident.  The standard interpretation of American-Korean relations just prior to and 
following the armistice holds that while the Eisenhower administration was keen to avoid further 
armed conflict in the area, Syngman Rhee appeared to desire continued fighting.
63
  However, 
Michael Gordon Jackson has proposed that in the event the ROK was attacked, the Eisenhower 
administration was willing to use atomic weapons in conjunction with a massive attack on 
Communist China, and thus a bellicose Rhee possibly instigating a Chinese attack would not 
have been an immediate and pressing concern.
64
  While Jackson’s proposals vis-à-vis 
Eisenhower’s willingness to fight a nuclear war over Korea are interesting, there are several 
significant flaws in his work.  For example, Jackson limits his portrayal of a nuclear trigger-
happy Eisenhower to the period just after the Korean Armistice, thus ignoring evidence such as 
Eisenhower’s 1954 blunt castigation of Rhee over his enthusiasm for a war of unification.65   
Nixon’s mission to the ROK, and events and communications which occurred during his 
mission but before he actually met Rhee, suggest that the Eisenhower administration was much 
more concerned with maintaining peace than it was enthusiastic for a nuclear war.  Nixon’s 
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briefing materials noted that a Communist attack on the ROK was unlikely, but there was reason 
to be concerned that Rhee would order an attack on North Korea, and that this order would be 
followed by his forces.
66
  Demonstrating the pressing nature of this concern is that while Nixon 
was conducting his mission, the policies of the Eisenhower administration towards the situations 
in Communist China and the Koreas were altered.  John Foster Dulles had sent a message to 
Nixon on November 4, 1953, instructing the vice president to gain an “explicit…assurance” from 
Rhee that the South Korean leader would not start, and attempt to drag the U.S. into, a war.
67
  
Dulles also mentioned to Nixon that he ought to communicate to Rhee that the U.S. would fully 
cooperate with Rhee to unify Korea by peaceful means, but that Rhee’s interests would be better 
served if he accepted America’s aid to rebuild Korea’s “devastated” economy.68  Further, on 
November 6, 1953, Nixon was advised by Everett Gleason, the Deputy Executive Secretary of 
the National Security Council, to deal with Rhee according to the new, less aggressive stance, 
advocated in Eisenhower’s new position for dealing with China.69  Gleason explained the new 
position as “a realistic view of our limited capabilities, short of war” to contain China in the 
event Rhee attacked North Korea.
70
  Thus, Nixon was to attempt to restrain Rhee.  These 
messages offer a preview of future developments in the Eisenhower administration but also 
display the administration’s focus on maintaining peace in Korea and the hopes that Richard 
Nixon could play a role in assuring it. 
Nixon’s modified orders reveal that the Eisenhower administration wanted to be certain 
that Syngman Rhee understood America’s position against renewed violence.  Together, the 
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messages to Nixon hint at the Eisenhower administration’s strategy of containment which would 
be much more developed by early 1955.
71
  Rather than planning on actively attacking 
Communist forces, the Eisenhower administration sought to strengthen existing allies against a 
fall to Communism.  The administration also aimed to contain and subvert Communism to such 
an extent that it crumbled from within.  In the hopes of pursuing this anti-Communist policy and 
avoiding the renewal of war in Korea a significant goal for Nixon’s mission was to restrain 
Syngman Rhee, and in this he was at least partially successful. 
Nixon was not able to gain explicit assurances that Rhee would not attack North Korea, 
but he exacted a concession from the ROK’s leader.  During Nixon’s first meeting with Rhee, 
Nixon was able to garner from Rhee a promise not to act unilaterally without first informing 
Eisenhower.
72
  This was not the explicit assurance that Dulles and Eisenhower had asked for, but 
Nixon explained that while Rhee would continue to speak publically in such a manner as to 
convey himself as an uncompromising anti-Communist, he understood the need to work with the 
United States.
73
  Nixon also argued that since Rhee specifically requested that the Eisenhower 
administration secretly use Korea as a tool in a similar manner to the Soviet Union’s use of its 
satellites, it was unlikely Rhee would go so far as to instigate a war without clear permission 
from America.
74
  As none of the members of the National Security Council (NSC) called the 
veracity of Nixon’s views into question, and since several members voiced enthusiasm for the 
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idea of using Rhee as a proxy, it is fair to conclude that the NSC (including Eisenhower and 
Dulles) considered Nixon’s conclusions and work to be acceptable.75   
While Nixon’s work in Korea and Vietnam involved diplomatic manoeuvering in order to 
avoid war, his objectives in India were to attempt to mollify resentment, gain support, and 
educate the neutralist nation.  It would be an understatement to claim that India’s neutralism 
perplexed both Nixon and the Eisenhower administration.  This being the case, the disdain Nixon 
and many in the Eisenhower administration felt towards Prime Minister Nehru and his non-
alignment policies meant that Nixon headed into India with perceptions which were decidedly  
not conducive to improving diplomatic relations.  By analysing Nixon’s briefing information, 
notes, speeches, and reports, one can better understand how Nixon viewed India’s neutralism, 
and compare this perspective to Nixon’s views on Communism.  The struggle to understand 
India, or rather the struggle to make India understand the global situation as the Eisenhower 
administration saw it, was one which confused and irritated Nixon.  Nixon’s visit to India and the 
tensions attached to it offer a glance at the growing complexities of the Cold War. 
Not only did Nehru’s decision to attempt to keep India “out” of the Cold War lead to 
problems with Nixon and the Eisenhower administration, but it also forced Eisenhower to seek 
alternatives to ensure containment of Communism.  Nehru’s attempt to adhere to neutralism was 
a tactic utilised by India and other nations to remain politically active and place a priority on 
maintaining peace while avoiding alignment to both Soviet and American allies; the perceived 
dangers of neutralism were brought up by American officials as early as 1949 under President 
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Truman.
76
  This led American and British strategists at the time and thereafter to believe the 
entire region was more vulnerable to Communist advances due to Nehru’s non-alignment, but it 
also caused the Eisenhower administration to look to Pakistan for an Asian anti-Communist 
bulwark to protect the Middle East.
77
  Nixon and the Eisenhower administration clearly had a 
negative view of neutralism, and this and other factors made Nixon’s mission to India difficult.   
Confusion, preceding events, and preconceived notions complicated Nixon’s mission in 
India from the outset.  Depending on one’s perspective, Nixon’s visit to India was either poorly 
or masterfully timed.  Nixon arrived in India at a time when the Indian government and public 
were anxious over American talks with Pakistan on military aid, resentful over the U.S.’s attitude 
concerning POWs in light of the Korean situation, and aggravated over India’s treatment at the 
United Nations.
78
  Although President Eisenhower recognised the important role India played in 
world affairs, he complained that “emotion, rather than reason” dictated policy in Nehru’s 
India.
79
  In his memoirs Nixon described his two meetings with Nehru in terms which portrayed 
the leader as overly emotional and “obsessive.”80  The Americans’ uncertainty in how to deal 
with India and Nehru is displayed clearly by contrasting Eisenhower’s opinions and Nixon’s 
retrospection, with the notes Nixon took during his meetings with Nehru and other Indian 
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officials. This uncertainty led to frustration which in turn led to a problematic relationship 
between the nations.   
The confusion and lack of understanding present in the Eisenhower administration in 
regards to Jawaharlal Nehru were made evident during Nixon’s mission to India.  Nixon’s first 
priority, and thus the first note he took, was to determine whether, in his “heart of hearts” Nehru 
was “pro-American.”81  That a primary part of Nixon’s mission was to determine whether Nehru 
was a friend or foe is indicative of the level of confusion within the administration.  The 
subsequent notes Nixon took from his conversations with Nehru and his ministers demonstrate a 
clear concern about Indians not doing enough to halt the advance of Communism in India.  Not 
knowing whether India was more loyal to the United States or the U.S.S.R. meant that suspicion 
of Indian actions continued to grow in the Eisenhower administration.  While it is arguable 
whether or not Nixon and the Eisenhower administration genuinely understood what Nehru 
meant by neutralism, it is clear that the American officials were convinced that adherence to 
neutralism was a naïve and problematic strategy.   
Nixon and other members and agencies of the Eisenhower administration viewed Nehru 
and his administration as naïve for Nehru’s belief that India could deal with all sides of the Cold 
War but not suffer consequences either domestically or internationally.  Previous to Nixon’s 
departure, the C.I.A. noted that while India had taken some steps against the “Communist 
menace,” such as accepting U.S. aid, it was Nehru’s commitment to non-alignment which was 
problematic.
82
  Recording his interpretation of meetings with Indian government officials, 
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Nixon’s notes convey a concern with the domestic influence of Communism.  Nixon inquired 
about the power of Communism in India and wrote notes on Indian students’ participation in 
communist activities turning against the government, the Indian belief that Communism could 
never succeed “in the long run,” and, connected to this, that India was characteristically “cursed” 
by division.
83
  Whether or not at this time Nixon shared the perspective of Nehru which John 
Foster Dulles held, that Nehru was an intransigent and troublesome leader for the United States 
to have to deal with in the region, is unclear.
84
  It is clear, however, that Nixon viewed Nehru as 
foolish for not recognising and going along with something the Eisenhower administration often 
took as commonplace: Communist infiltration of Asia had begun with China, and without strong 
alignment to the United States, other nations were vulnerable to it as well.
85
  Again, Nixon’s 
adherence to containment and the domino theory was displayed.   
Nehru’s decision to maintain a neutralist India was also one which Nixon and American 
officials thought endangered India’s safety, and thus it was viewed as a foolhardy strategy.  
American estimates of the strength of India’s military argued that while sufficient to maintain 
internal security, and defend itself against Pakistan, India would be unable to resist an incursion 
by a major power such as the Soviet Union or Communist China.
86
  The inability to defend itself 
from Communist aggression alone meant neutralism appeared foolhardy to the Eisenhower 
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administration, but India’s fear of “Western imperialism,” along with its active ignorance of the 
“new and far more aggressive Communist imperialism” caused American officials to view 
Nehru’s government as unsophisticated.87  To American officials who had embraced the 
perspective of a bipolar world in which the non-Communist world was constantly under threat, 
be it political, economic, or military, from the Communist world, India’s insistence on dealing 
with both worlds created confusion and frustration.
88
  Part of this stemmed from the opposing 
beliefs each side held:  American officials believed the Cold War was inherently global, while 
Indian officials believed that it was regional, and that only by America’s involvement with 
Pakistan would the Cold War be brought to the subcontinent.
89
  American officials held that 
India would not have been “shocked” by China’s conquest of Tibet had the Indians accepted that 
such actions would always be a part of Communist aggression.
90
   
Nixon’s appraisal of Nehru reveals much about his mindset regarding Communism at the 
time, as well as how he was suspicious of the motives behind Nehru’s professed neutralism.  
After meeting with Nehru, Nixon came to the conclusion that India’s leader wished to be “the 
leader of Asia.”91  Nixon also concluded that Nehru’s narcissism and patriotism were the main 
motivations behind Nehru’s apparent dislike for the United States, Great Britain, China, and the 
Soviet Union.
92
  When he presented his report to State Department and other officials, Nixon 
argued that the reason Nehru objected to U.S.-Pakistan military agreements was because Nehru 
desired that no country in the surrounding area, which included East Africa, should be able to 
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resist Indian dominance, and the United States’ agreements with Pakistan complicated such a 
desire.
93
   
The Eisenhower administration had been contemplating, and was coming ever closer to 
granting significant military aid to Pakistan for its defence, the containment of Communism, and 
the defence of the Middle East.  While the original impetus for aiding Pakistan militarily had 
come from British officials, by 1953 both Pakistani and American officials had concluded that at 
least some military and economic aid, granted covertly or not, in exchange for closer cooperation 
containing Communism would be of substantial benefit.
94
  Whether the benefits would out-
weigh the costs, such as alienating India, was a contentious issue.  Indian officials became aware 
at least by November 16, 1953 of the possibility of an arms deal and military pact between 
America and Pakistan, less than a month before Nixon arrived.
95
  Thus, those members of the 
Eisenhower administration on the NSC were aware of the friction America’s military pacts with 
Pakistan created with India.  That the Eisenhower administration proceeded with such 
agreements was at least in part due to the contention that any nation which accepted American 
aid would be more able to resist Communist aggression. 
Nixon’s notes and report on India, in which he defended military aid to Pakistan, contain 
an interesting perspective on how the Eisenhower administration viewed itself, its aid, and its 
enemies.  Nixon gave a speech in India which argued that American leadership and ideologies 
were peaceful and freedom loving, stating that “peoples everywhere long for peace…and for an 
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end to the fear of men who try to impose their own way of life on others.”96  Beyond the implicit 
criticism of Communism was the characterisation of American values as those of peace and 
freedom.  The vice president also noted that the United States gave aid to nations in the belief 
that “strong free nations…will never start war.”97   
 The vice president also argued forcefully that such recipients should fall in line with the 
American desires, as he indicated when he later compared Indian and Pakistani reactions to U.S. 
programs.  Nixon’s impressions of Pakistan and the officials he met while there in 1953 indicate 
he had a much more positive view of Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S.  In his report on the 
trip, Nixon often made a point of contrasting Indian and Pakistani attitudes.  In one instance, the 
vice president explained the relief he felt when several Pakistani officials told him Pakistan’s 
position bluntly:  that a failure to secure military support from the U.S. would certainly damage 
Pakistan’s relationship with America, but Pakistan’s continued support was assured.98  Nixon 
compared this to the confusion and anxiety he felt while dealing with Indian officials who 
maintained the position of neutralism.
99
  According to the vice president, the Pakistanis 
demonstrated a sufficient amount of gratitude and friendship since those he spoke to openly 
supported American policies, were grateful for American aid, and appeared to accept the difficult 
diplomatic position America was in with regard to India and Pakistan.
100
  In contrast, Nixon 
argued that Indians both in government and at the civilian level, were not only ungrateful but 
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denied receiving aid.
101
  Nixon found this troubling, but was not surprised by such denials.  
Indeed, Nixon’s frustrations with India’s and Nehru’s attitude towards American policies were 
shared by many in the Eisenhower administration, and this contributed to foreign policies which 
sought to bring the Indian government’s attention to the benefits of cooperating with American 
endeavours, and the dangers of intransigence. 
Nehru’s staunch neutralism led to American officials being more likely to make decisions 
which would irritate or worry Indians, such as giving more aid to Pakistan.  In a telegram 
message sent to Nixon before he met with Nehru, Dulles asked Nixon to attempt to discern if the 
advantages of finalising the military pact with Pakistan could be outweighed by the 
disadvantages of alienating India.
102
  The advantages Dulles listed reveal much about the State 
Department’s view of India.  If the pact with Pakistan was successfully finalised, the U.S. could:  
increase defensive capabilities of pro-Western Pakistan, overcome neutralist tendencies in parts 
of the Pakistani government, “pave the way for…defense arrangements [in] Iraq, Iran and 
Turkey, and eventually other ME [Middle Eastern] states…as well as eventual U.S. base rights,” 
and finally demonstrate to Nehru that the U.S. did not “dance to his tune.”103   
Aside from the clear ambitions for American military expansion in the Middle East and 
Asia, it should be noted that if the State Department considered it advantageous to weaken 
neutralism and demonstrate to Nehru that America was willing to ignore India’s concerns, then 
Nixon was not alone in his disdain for neutralism.  The trip to India displays the Eisenhower 
administration’s discomfort with a nation striving to avoid the bipolar world which the 
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administration saw as a de facto reality.  Nixon’s role there was to gauge whether Nehru was 
friend or foe, and the depth to which this goodwill or enmity flowed.  Finding Nehru to be only a 
nominal ally, Nixon and the administration proceeded on the most expedient path towards 
Eisenhower’s goal of securing the region from Communism.   
Nixon’s time in Iran shows that when the Eisenhower administration dealt with friendly 
nations which were believed to have strategic value, the administration placed a priority on the 
ability of that nation’s government and economy to resist Communist influence.  This visit 
granted Nixon yet another opportunity to practice international diplomacy, but he was also 
careful to investigate matters of great strategic importance to the Eisenhower administration.  
During his time in Iran, Nixon enquired at length about Iran’s oil resources.  Iran’s oil was 
viewed as “the only long term hope” for Iran to improve its economic problems.104  The matter 
of Iran’s oil was a complex one. 
The coup in August of 1953 did not translate into an immediate resolution of Iranian-
British disagreement over oil rights, and when Nixon visited it had still not been resolved.  The 
CIA-led coup in Iran has a complex history; however, some context is necessary to understand 
its significance to Nixon’s mission.  While actual preparations for the coup may have begun as 
early as 1952, it was not until 1953, when John Foster Dulles conceived of an allied and stable 
Iran as a “pivotal” piece of the plan for collective security in the Middle East, that preparations 
became actions.
105
  The “actions” in question included some involvement from Britain’s MI6, a 
great deal of propaganda, the bribery of both Iranian citizens and military officers, no small 
amount of luck, and the overthrow of the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh due to 
                                                          
104
 CIA Briefing Book for the Vice President, 28 September, 1953, 55, DDEL. 
105
 Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War, 112. 
32 
 
the suspicion he might have Communist sympathies.
106
  The coup was designed to remove an 
unknown and uncontrollable factor in Mossadegh with the much more compliant Mohammad 
Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, or, more simply, the Shah.107  While the coup was successful in this regard, it 
could not solve all of Iran’s international dilemmas, and Richard Nixon’s mission to Iran was 
intended to examine and help ameliorate some of these. 
During his talks with Iranian officials, the vice president argued for a hastened resolution 
to the oil settlement as he proposed that the more quickly an agreement was made, the better 
Iran’s chances of “keeping the Commies from taking over.”108  Although the Eisenhower 
administration’s fear of domestic Communist takeover in Iran was diminished after General-
turned-Prime-Minister Zahedi “crippled” the main Communist movement in Iran, its fear of the 
U.S.S.R.’s influence or actions remained, and Nixon voiced this fear.109  Defence of Iran’s oil 
resources was viewed by the Eisenhower administration not only as a strategic necessity, but also 
as a matter of international prestige, and global security.
110
  Nixon and the Eisenhower 
administration made known and constantly trumpeted the link between Iran’s oil and the threat 
of Communist aggression. 
Nixon’s notes, questions, and subsequent report suggest that the Eisenhower 
administration was intent on making certain that the new, pro-American Iranian government 
would survive, and that impediments to its survival were a global threat.  In Nixon’s report and 
in his notes, the most referenced subject in relation to both Prime Minister Zahedi and the Shah 
was “oil.”  Iran’s ability to access and profit from its oil resources was believed by the 
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Eisenhower administration to be the key to the Shah and Zahedi maintaining control over the 
country.
111
  When he gave his report, Nixon argued that, as concerned the oil settlement, the 
Iranians were acting far more in the interest of global stability than were the British; he accused 
the British of intransigency and also of being willing to allow the Soviet Union to settle the 
dispute if the terms were not to Great Britain’s liking.112  The accuracy of this criticism is not as 
significant as the fact that Nixon was attempting to drive home to American officials the 
importance of a speedy conclusion for the oil settlement, and the risks involved if this did not 
occur.  Nixon’s criticism echoed the concerns Special Envoy Herbert Hoover Jr. and 
Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich had raised less than a month before:  British reluctance to 
negotiate was frustrating American efforts.
113
  The driving factor behind Nixon’s (and the 
administration’s) fear of Communist control of Iran’s oil was that such control would mean that 
the Soviet Union would become significantly more powerful and aggressive. 
 Nixon was not alone in his fear of the Soviet Union gaining control over Iran’s oil, and 
this meant that both Nixon and the administration thought it necessary to argue for measures 
meant to diminish Communist influence in Iran.  If the Soviets gained control over Iran’s oil, 
Pakistan and Turkey would likely be the only countries in the region that would be able to resist 
the ensuing Communist pressure and power.
114
  Thus domestic or foreign Communist activity in 
Iran was viewed by the Eisenhower administration as both a regional and international threat.  
This fear was not isolated to the Eisenhower administration:  Iranian press coverage following 
Nixon’s visit also made note of the need for Iran to finalise an oil settlement and take control of 
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its resources so that Iran could contribute to world peace and “check the spread of 
Communism.”115  Whether such articles were government-mandated propaganda, which they 
likely were, does not alter the fact that the Eisenhower administration clearly pushed the idea to 
Iranians that Communist control over Iranian resources would threaten peace on a global level.   
In many of his meetings with Iranian officials, and at other occasions during his time in 
the country, Nixon expressed the Eisenhower administration’s goal to protect Iran’s economy 
from Communist threats.  During a meeting on December 10, 1953, with officials from Iran’s 
Labour Ministry and Trade Unions, the only topic of discussion was that of combating 
Communism in Iran’s workforce.  In the course of this meeting the trade unionists noted that 
Communism in Iran was known to be controlled by the Soviets, and thus Communism’s success 
had been limited; Nixon noted aloud that it was smart of the Iranians to resist Communism since 
“free” labour leaders would fight for their labourers while Communist labour leaders would fight 
for whatever would most benefit the Soviet Union.
116
  At another meeting, this time with Iranian 
businessmen, Nixon again linked Iran’s economic development with a successful defence against 
Communism.  The vice president argued that Iran ought to diversify its economy beyond simply 
exporting oil, and then immediately launched into questions concerning areas of Communist 
growth within the country.
117
  At almost every opportunity during his time in Iran, Nixon warned 
Iranians about the dangers of Communism. 
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The dangers of perceived Communist aggression towards Iran led Nixon to attempt to 
bolster anti-Communism in Iran.  Nixon was committed to the idea that Communist infiltration 
of university students would pose a great threat to Iran’s future, as he requested clarification as to 
why Communist influence as a whole in Iran was waning, but seemed to be growing in the 
student community.
118
  Indeed, when he accepted an honourary doctorate at the University of 
Tehran, Nixon contended that a desire among Iranians to preserve their “independence and 
integrity” would not be possible if Iran was lost to Communism.119  Implicit here was that the 
Iranians’ independence and integrity would be supported by the United States if Iran maintained 
close ties to the U.S., a point Nixon made more explicitly to Americans living in Iran.
120
  Nixon 
and the Shah agreed that Iran’s military ought to be expanded beyond its limited function of 
maintaining internal security to the point that Iran could at least temporarily defend against 
foreign aggression, a buildup that would be significantly supported by U.S. aid.
121
  In his notes, 
the vice president theorised that if built up militarily, Iran, in concert with Pakistan and Turkey, 
could fend off a Soviet attack.
122
  Though such a scenario appeared unlikely, it is significant that 
such time and effort was put into planning counters to possible Soviet actions, and displays the 
importance placed on containment. 
Richard Nixon’s first foreign mission as Vice President was beneficial to both the 
Eisenhower administration’s anti-Communist containment policies and Nixon’s experience as a 
statesman.  That the mission was considered a great success by both Nixon and the Eisenhower 
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administration is not of central importance.
123
  Of greater importance is that Nixon travelled to 
Asian and Middle Eastern nations warning against the ever-present dangers of Communism in all 
its forms, yet did so while advocating an avoidance of overt hostilities.  From his notes, 
telegrams, and report it is clear that in 1953 Nixon did not question the dangers of Communism, 
nor did he have a problem attributing anti-American sentiment to either Communist subversion 
or, in Nehru’s case, naïve stubborn ingratitude.  At the end of 1953 the Eisenhower 
administration was taking action with its New Look policy, and its allies played a significant role 
in this.  Formosa and Korea were being stabilised and built up militarily in the hopes of 
containing Communist China and North Korea, and the attention paid to Vietnam was very much 
in the same vein.  Pakistan and Iran were also significant for the place the Americans envisioned 
for them towards containing Communism, and for how they represented the benefits of 
cooperating with American endeavours.  Thus Richard Nixon’s diplomatic role in each of these 
nations is significant as well.  In 1953 the New Look was emerging on the international stage, 
and Nixon with it.  Neither had yet to have a great effect but in 1953 both were focused on 
containing Communism in all its forms.   
By 1957, the New Look had had time to be put into effect and Richard Nixon had 
developed as a statesman.  Nixon’s mission to several nations in Africa, north of the equator, was 
initially designed as little more than a goodwill mission.  However, Nixon transformed this duty 
into a diplomatic tour which enabled him to gauge the impact the New Look had had on those 
nations he visited, investigate the concerns of those nations, and recommend where and how 
changes might be made in Eisenhower’s policies in Africa. 
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Chapter Two:  1957 Africa 
“To strengthen yourself, strengthen your friends”124  
 At the time of Nixon’s mission to Africa, the Eisenhower administration’s policies’ main 
objective for the continent was the containment of Communism.  The vice president’s mission to 
Africa was at least partially meant to gauge and predict the success of Communist manoeuvres 
and infiltration of the newly emerging independent nations of Africa, as well as the impact of 
Nasserism, though this was a less significant concern.  Indeed, a report compiled by the 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) after Nixon’s mission listed “The Communist Threat” as 
the foremost problem “facing the United States” in Africa.125  Still, while it is clear that the 
Eisenhower administration’s anti-Communist policies influenced Nixon’s mission, it is equally 
apparent that Nixon took a more sophisticated and nuanced approach than simple anti-
Communism during his trip to Africa.  Nixon’s recommendations resulted in the creation of the 
Bureau of African Affairs, and the writing of the first comprehensive policy paper on African 
affairs.  This mission demonstrated the vice president’s pragmatism, and his ability to recognize 
weaknesses in the Eisenhower administration’s current policies and the opportunities which 
existed for America in Africa.  
 During Eisenhower’s time as president, several African nations under colonial rule were 
seeking, and gaining, their independence.  This move to independence complicated the 
Eisenhower administration’s position, as made clear by the New Look’s complaint that “the 
colonial issue…has not only weakened our European allies but has left those areas in a 
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state…which weakens the whole free world.”126  The New Look voiced further frustration at the 
problems caused by emerging African nations by warning that anti-colonialism, “racial-
feelings,” nationalism, and other factors led to resentment of the West, and thus made combating 
the influence of Communism all the more important yet all the more difficult.
127
  At the outset of 
his presidency, Eisenhower faced complicated situations in newly emerging or independent 
African nations such as Morocco, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Tunisia, Sudan, and Libya.  
Challenges in Ethiopia and Liberia were less immediate but no less important. While the New 
Look spelled out goals, such as bringing African nations from an “undeveloped” to “developed” 
status, it did not prescribe a method of achieving them in Africa.
128
  The Eisenhower 
administration struggled to address this lack of direction into its second term. 
 The Eisenhower administration’s attempt to address its previously unsophisticated 
policies towards Africa was at least part of the reason for Nixon’s 1957 mission.  The 
Eisenhower administration was, for the greater part of its first term, far more focused on Europe, 
Asia, and the Middle East, than on Africa.
129
  Indeed, a combination of Eisenhower’s personal 
disinterest in ever-complicating African affairs, and a general policy to attempt to maintain the 
status quo in Africa and continue Truman-era policies of “slow evolution” towards African 
decolonization dictated little active involvement.
130
  Despite an increasingly clear need to 
revamp its African policies, the Eisenhower administration took relatively little action until 1955, 
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when economic aid was increased.
131
  Still, it was not until after Richard Nixon’s 1957 “fact-
finding” mission that true reassessment and an actual revamping of policies occurred.132 
Historians have often criticised the Eisenhower administration for a lack of sophistication 
in its attitude towards the “third world.”133  John Lewis Gaddis argues that although Eisenhower 
and Dulles attempted to foster a positive relationship between the U.S. and various African 
nations, confusion, frustration, fear of Communist subversion, and simple arrogance on the part 
of the Americans frustrated those attempts.
134
  John Prados contends that while the president 
accepted the C.I.A.’s evaluation that decolonisation was inevitable, Eisenhower “routinely 
bungled” his attempts to take advantage of this from a policy standpoint, meaning successfully 
working with emerging African nations to keep them in the “free world”.135  Randall Bennett 
Woods argues that the Eisenhower administration was “oblivious” to local rivalries in the third 
world, and that it viewed all nationalistic revolutions as “part of the international communist 
conspiracy.”136  Steven Metz maintains that Africa was simply not a high priority region for the 
majority of the time Eisenhower was in office, pointing out that until 1958, the Bureau of Near 
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Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs handled diplomatic matters concerning all of Africa, as 
well as the other regions under its purview.
137
   
The arguments and evidence of historians who have conducted more in-depth studies 
show the measured but clear development of the Eisenhower administration’s policies in Africa.  
Egya Sangmuah demonstrates that at least until the latter half of the 1950’s, the Eisenhower 
administration was nearly incapable of taking advantage of nationalism in Africa due to its focus 
on containing Communism, and in the cases it did succeed, the success came at the price of 
alienating European allies.
138
  Kenneth Osgood argues that Eisenhower’s policies towards the 
third world became more sophisticated due to the perception in the administration that peaceful 
Soviet overtures from the mid-1950s onward necessitated a change in policies.
139
  The rise of 
Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his form of pan-Arab nationalism, also forced the Eisenhower 
administration to develop a more nuanced set of policies for the Africa-Middle East political 
region from 1957 onwards.
140
 
James Meriwether succinctly demonstrates that the Eisenhower administration, in at least 
some part due to Richard Nixon, had a slow but evolving perspective on its African policies.
141
  
In Meriwether’s view, Richard Nixon was the “father” of the African policy eventually 
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implemented by the Eisenhower administration.
142
  Meriwether also argues that Nixon spent 
much of his Africa trip obsessing over possible Communist in-roads into the vulnerable nations 
of the continent.
143
 
  However, Meriwether places too much emphasis on the vice president’s concerns with 
communist infiltration in Africa. Rather than being overly concerned about Communist progress 
in the region, Nixon’s notes actually convey a keen awareness of political gamesmanship on the 
part of the African nations.  According to the vice president, some African leaders planned to 
play the Soviets off against the Americans in the hopes of gaining better deals.
144
  Thus, Nixon 
had a much more sophisticated understanding of these African nations than Meriwether gives 
him credit for. 
The initial impetus for the Africa mission, proposed first by John Foster Dulles, was 
limited to having Nixon visit only the Gold Coast (Ghana) for its independence ceremonies.
145
  
At the same time, Dulles suggested that Nixon should visit President William Tubman in 
Monrovia, Liberia, but did not insist on this.
146
  In response to Dulles’s request, Nixon demanded 
a presidential mandate, essentially a request from Eisenhower himself that the vice president 
undertake the mission.  This mandate was given the next day, whereupon the vice president 
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accepted the mission to Ghana and Liberia.
147
  According to Benjamin Goldberg, Nixon believed 
that without a presidential mandate and a clear message from Eisenhower that his mission was 
“vital” to the Eisenhower administration’s purposes, the trip to Africa was not worth the 
“displeasure” Nixon felt at being a “messenger boy.”148  Indeed, between the time Nixon 
received the president’s mandate, on January 29, and the time the mission actually began, on 
February 28, Nixon managed to add Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Italy, and 
Libya to the list of nations he would visit.
149
   
That Nixon was able to garner a presidential mandate and expand the mission in 1957 is 
important for two key reasons in relation to the vice president’s development as a statesman.150  
The first is that Nixon’s ability and willingness to seek an expansion of the scope of the mission 
to Africa displays his growing confidence in his place within the Eisenhower administration.  
The second, and equally important reason, is that such a manoeuver on Nixon’s part displays his 
increased desire for exposure to foreign affairs.    
Significantly, Nixon transformed a short, and relatively ceremonial, mission to two 
countries into a diplomatic expedition which included seven more nations than had been 
proposed originally.  At this point Nixon was obviously influencing the Eisenhower 
administration’s foreign affairs, since the vice president was a diplomatic representative and he 
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manoeuvred for a chance to represent and gauge Eisenhower’s foreign policies in more nations 
than Dulles or Eisenhower had intended.  The fact that Nixon used the mission to attempt to 
bring substantial changes to the administration’s policies towards Africa, and that he also 
demonstrated a great concern for expanding American influence rather than solely containing 
that of Communist powers, shows that Nixon was quite capable of adapting to the unique 
challenges and opportunities in Africa.   
The conversations between Nixon and Sultan Mohamed V of Morocco, ruler of the first 
nation the vice president visited on his mission, are notable in that they display Nixon’s 
development as a statesman, but they also demonstrate an interesting shift in convention.  In 
1953 it was usually the case that Nixon’s first questions with representatives or leaders of other 
nations would focus in some way on Communism’s influence in the area, and Nixon was often 
the one who brought up Communism in the first place.
151
  When the vice president met with 
Morocco’s Sultan, however, it was the Sultan who first addressed the threat of Communism, and 
while the Sultan discounted its danger to Morocco he recognised the need to maintain “a 
common front” against Communist efforts.152  Interestingly, during the course of their 
conversation, Nixon neither acknowledged the Sultan’s anti-Communist remarks, nor directly 
mentioned Communism at all.
153
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Portions of Nixon’s conversation with Sultan Mohamed V and his related notes display 
Nixon’s intention to place more emphasis on America’s presence in Morocco and the other 
nations he visited during his mission.  When the topic of conversation moved to the American 
military bases in Morocco, Nixon was quick to concede that the United States might need to 
adjust aid figures or renegotiate the terms to be of greater benefit to Morocco, but he was just as 
quick to argue that the maintenance of those bases was “very definitely in the interest of 
Morocco and the free world in general.”154  Clearly, Nixon was making it known that the 
Eisenhower administration considered the amount and availability of American aid to be linked 
to Morocco’s continued authorization of American military bases.155  The vice president’s notes 
also make no direct mention of Communism in relation to Morocco, but do mention U.S. bases 
and the hope that if the Sultan approved the American bases, the Eisenhower administration 
would double aid to Morocco.
156
  Obviously, the purpose of these bases was not ornamental; 
their primary function was to support the administration’s anti-Communist policies.  Still, it is 
intriguing that Nixon did not mention this in his notes or conversations with the Sultan. 
Nixon’s briefing book on Africa specifically mentioned that the Soviets would attempt to 
exchange diplomatic representatives with Ghana as part of their greater strategy to “penetrate” 
Africa.
157
 Significantly, however, the vice president also went to great lengths to avoid directly 
discussing Communism or the Soviet Union in his conversations in Ghana.  When he spoke with 
Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, Nixon asked for clarification of Ghana’s future position in 
foreign policy; more specifically, whether Nkrumah meant “nationalist” when he described 
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Ghana’s position as neutral.158  When Nkrumah and his Secretary for External Affairs mentioned 
that Ghana might need to establish greater diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Nixon 
responded by making certain that the Ghanaian government would “vigorously support freedom 
of speech… and other democratic traditions.”159  While the vice president was aware of the threat 
of Communism in the area, Nixon was convinced that there were other important issues that 
ought to be dealt with in order ensure close relations between the U.S. and Ghana.   
In his talks with Ghanaian officials Nixon placed great emphasis on Ghana’s economic 
future, and American influence on the new African nations which were becoming independent.  
Nixon talked at length about the former with Nkrumah, specifically the Volta River Project 
(VRP), a combination hydro-electric/aluminum production project which Nkrumah envisioned 
providing great wealth for Ghana and its international investors.
160
 The vice president’s 
recommendations on the VRP to Eisenhower bear out both the importance of the project and of 
having a higher-quality American presence in Ghana.
161
  Of course, American officials were 
already aware of the importance Nkrumah placed on the VRP due to Nkrumah’s constant search 
for investment and aid in the project.  Still, it is unlikely a coincidence that in his 
recommendations on Ghana, Nixon sandwiched an explanation of Nkrumah’s desire for 
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American advice and representation between two separate sections which emphasized the VRP’s 
importance.
162
   
Nixon showed the most concern for Communist influence in Africa in Liberia, but it was 
still far from the level of concern or focus he had shown on previous missions.  Nixon’s 
conversation with President Tubman, which took place on March 8, 1957, is important in that 
while Nixon was the first to bring up the threat of “Communist subversion” in Africa, he did so 
in a way that suggested it was as a matter of course rather than a topic he wished to discuss in 
depth.
163
  Nixon touched on the Communist threat and quickly moved to explaining to Tubman 
the “unique” responsibilities Liberia and Ghana would share as independent nations in Africa.164  
Nixon both gauged Tubman’s estimates of Communist success in Ghana and convinced Tubman 
to take greater steps to try to curtail Communist advances in Liberia and Africa in general.
165
  
Tubman later informed Nixon of Nkrumah’s response to a message the Liberian had sent to the 
Ghanaian in regards to cooperating in efforts against Communism.  That Tubman informed 
Nixon of this message shows that either Tubman felt obligated to do so, or that Tubman believed 
Nixon would want to know.
166
 
Nixon’s conversations with several Ethiopian officials as well as his related notes 
demonstrate that the vice president developed a more nuanced view of Communism and 
international relations, and that he intended to attempt to secure America’s influence over 
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African nations where possible.  Nixon met with many Ethiopian officials, including Emperor 
Haile Selassie, and did not once bring up concerns over Communism.  Ethiopian officials 
insisted that increased aid meant Ethiopia would be in a better position to support American 
aims, such as regional security.  Selassie attempted to portray Ethiopia as in need of not only 
military but economic aid, stating that he believed he would “utilise United States economic aid 
to help correct” the problem of Ethiopian unemployment.167  Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister Ato 
Aklilou was incredibly open in his attempt to convince Nixon of Ethiopia’s usefulness when he 
argued that Ethiopia was an African and Middle Eastern country; with U.S. aid it could be of 
value in both regions.
168
   
Nixon’s meeting with Ethiopia’s prime minister persuaded him that the nation was 
deserving of more efficient aid delivery. The vice president was convinced Ethiopia was willing 
to act as an American proxy and simply needed more aid to do so effectively.  When he met with 
Prime Minister Endelkachew, Nixon was immediately confronted with an indirect question that 
resonated with the vice president:  if the United States wanted to be able to exert its influence in 
Africa, how could it do so with militarily weak allies?
169
  That Endelkachew’s arguments 
persuaded Nixon was made clear in the vice president’s notes.  Above several recommendations 
he believed would help Ethiopia, Nixon quoted the exact words the prime minister had used 
during their meeting:  “to strengthen yourself, strengthen your friends.”170  Indeed, Nixon argued 
that Ethiopia, if properly armed and directed, could be quite useful as an American proxy in 
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Africa and the Middle East.  Such a proxy would most likely be used to counter any perceived 
Communist manoeuvres in the region, but could certainly be used for other purposes, such as 
combating moves or attempts at regional “domination” by Nasser’s Egypt, which was a concern 
touched on by several leaders throughout Nixon’s trip.171 
Nixon explained his recommendations for increased military aid to Ethiopia in terms 
which conveyed a desire to maintain or expand American influence.  On March 25, after he had 
returned from Africa, the vice president wrote memos to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, as 
well as to Dulles, recommending that military aid to Ethiopia be expanded, and managed in a 
much more meticulous fashion.
172
  Nixon argued that expanding and better managing military 
aid to Ethiopia would be useful due to Ethiopia’s “increasingly important influence in African 
affairs” and that “enlightened self-interest requires that we ensure their continued friendship and 
support of our policies.”173  Indeed, Nixon suggested that if enough aid was given to Ethiopia 
then the United States could employ the Ethiopian armed forces as a “neutral” police force in 
“appropriate situations.”174  Importantly, in an earlier draft of this memo, Nixon had originally 
written “the area of the Middle East,” but later replaced it with “appropriate situations,” 
indicating the vice president believed the Ethiopian armed forces might be put to use in 
maintaining stability should either a Soviet or Egyptian threat rear its head.
175
  Given the 
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Eisenhower Doctrine’s promise to provide aid to maintain the independence of any Middle 
Eastern nation vulnerable to Communist attacks, Nixon’s enthusiasm for building up Ethiopia’s 
military strength certainly fell in line with the doctrine’s intent.176   
Nixon’s arguments to the president also focused on securing American influence over 
Ethiopia.  Three of the five recommendations Nixon made to Eisenhower on Ethiopia concerned 
military topics.  The vice president argued that since Ethiopia had adhered to American foreign 
policy, and since it was committed to “collective security,” an important aspect of the New Look, 
it would be in the U.S. interest to help build up Ethiopia‘s armed forces.177  Relatedly, Nixon 
advised that if the United States sought to secure base facilities in Ethiopia in addition to those 
they already had, it would help the American cause to increase aid there.
178
  Significantly, none 
of Nixon’s recommendations regarding Ethiopia mentioned or alluded to Communism, the 
Soviet Union, or an external or internal threat of any kind.  This does not mean that the vice 
president no longer perceived Communism as a threat, but it does point to a growing focus on 
building America’s influence abroad rather than simply holding back Soviet influence.  Nixon 
realised the benefit of having allies who supported American policies and interests, such as 
general regional stability in the Middle East, over allies who simply supported anti-Communism. 
During his conversations with Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil and Foreign 
Minister Ahmad Mahjub on March 13, 1957, Nixon asked, as he often did, about general 
Communist infiltration of the student communities, but only after the prime minister and foreign 
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minister argued in front of Nixon over the merits of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Sudan’s strong 
efforts against Communism, and the level of Communist infiltration at the University of 
Khartoum.
179
  Nixon did take note of the prime minister’s high estimate that up to fifty percent of 
university students were communist, but also took the opportunity to write down a clearly 
facetious solution:  “more university students needed.”180  Nixon’s notes on his mission to Sudan 
show some small concern with Communist infiltration, but as his conversations with Libyan and 
Tunisian officials illustrate, it was not the focal point of his attention. 
In conversations with Libyan and Tunisian officials, Nixon focused his attention on 
African nationalism and a contemptuous dismissal of Soviet propaganda.  In his conversation 
with Tunisia’s deputy prime minister on March 18, 1957, Nixon noted the “devotion 
to…independence” prevalent in the nations he had visited and commented that such nations were 
likely proud to not “slavishly” follow the dictates of another country.181  In his notes, Nixon 
made a point to record that the Eisenhower administration thought Tunisia’s current government 
fit well with current American goals, and thus wanted the Tunisian government “kept in power” 
but did not go into further detail.
182
  When he spoke with Mustafa Ben Halim, Libya’s prime 
minister, Nixon brought up Communism only to dismiss the Soviets’ criticisms of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, which Halim declared was a wonderful policy for the U.S. to initiate, as he 
appeared to believe it created the opportunity for “Arab solidarity.”183  Halim vocally opposed 
Communism without prodding from Nixon, and went so far as to divulge that he had recently 
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demanded that the Soviet mission in Tripoli reduce its staff.
184
  Nixon was clearly more focused 
on improving America’s ability to influence Libya since he argued in his notes that in order to 
counteract Egypt’s influence over Libya, American assistance to Libya ought to be increased.185   
During his mission to Africa, Nixon recognised an opportunity for America in the newly 
emerging nations.  Nixon’s notes convey significant concern with Ghana and other emerging 
African nations.  The vice president worried that independence, and the anticipated independence 
of Uganda, Nigeria, and Kenya, might well be coming “too soon,” but that such events would 
occur and thus the U.S. ought to plan accordingly.
186
  Although such nations would likely begin 
their existences “free,” without guidance and “strong advice” they could easily lose that 
freedom.
187
  This again shows that Nixon was concerned about Communism, but also about 
ensuring American influence in Africa.   
Nixon’s report on his findings from his mission to Africa caused much conversation 
within the Eisenhower administration.  Not only was the vice president’s report on Africa 
circulated throughout circles in the Eisenhower administration, it was insightful and contentious 
enough that John B. Hollister, head of the International Cooperation Administration/Association 
(ICA), an organization created by the State Department to coordinate the U.S.’s foreign aid, sent 
Nixon and the entire National Security Council a point by point commentary on the report.
188
  
The majority of Hollister’s comments were explanations of why the ICA agreed with Nixon.189  
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Thus, whatever course the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration took in Africa, it did 
not take such a course without discussion of various options, as the ICA report often cited 
budgetary or diplomatic alternatives whether it agreed or disagreed with Nixon’s 
recommendations.
190
   
Nixon’s report to Eisenhower on his mission to Africa strongly points out the Communist 
threat despite Nixon having shown little interest in it while actually in Africa.  Some of the 
recommendations in the vice president’s report include scathing judgements of the current status 
of both the Eisenhower administration’s efforts in Africa and the U.S., often hidden within 
warnings about Communist encroachment.  One of Nixon’s recommendations begins by praising 
Eisenhower and the U.S.’s symbolic position in Africa, then moves to state that embassies and 
related diplomatic missions in Africa ought to be, meaning they currently were not, staffed by 
people skilled enough to explain American policies in such a way that those policies would 
appear indicative of the “independence, equality, and economic progress” which Africans 
admired the U.S. for.
191
  The vice president also pointed out that American diplomatic officials 
allowed racial prejudices to negatively impact international relations.
192
  Nixon viewed such 
problems as personality issues, as the vice president noted that ambassador John Tappin had 
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done a good job in Libya but that his “personal character” was a deficiency which might 
necessitate his dismissal.
193
 
  Nixon’s pragmatism is further evidenced by his linkage of domestic problems and their 
international implications.  When the vice president addressed racial discrimination in the United 
States in his report to Eisenhower, he not only demonstrated the importance of such problems 
vis-à-vis U.S.-Africa relations, but also showed how such problems were hindering America 
from winning the Cold War.  Nixon portrayed Soviet propaganda about domestic racial 
prejudices in America as overblown yet skillful and persistent. While Soviet propaganda on 
racism in America was not accurate, the Communists were exploiting a real weakness in 
American society and gaining influence in African and Middle Eastern nations because of it.
194
  
In his report to Eisenhower on Africa, Nixon first pointed out the hypocrisy of preaching equality 
abroad but not practising it at home, and then offered a solution that he claimed was both in the 
“national interest,” and morally necessary:  “the elimination of discrimination in the United 
States.”195  The vice president also couched these recommendations in terms which created a 
sense of immediacy in acting on them.  Nixon portrayed Africa as the “priority target” for 
Communism, arguing that Africa was the new China, but also stating that at present most 
African leaders stood against Communist influence, meaning that the Eisenhower administration 
ought to deal with the problems in current domestic and international issues immediately or risk 
losing Africa.
196
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The 1957 mission to Africa granted Nixon an opportunity to develop as a statesman, but 
it also served a significant purpose for the Eisenhower administration.  Indeed, many of Nixon’s 
recommendations were carried over into America’s first “comprehensive” policy on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, NSC 5719/1, which contributed to the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs in 
1958.
197
  This policy stressed that the U.S. should help independent African nations develop in 
an “orderly manner,” work to solidify nationalist governments against Soviet and Egyptian 
“Islamic” overtures, respectively, and move to maintain and create ties between emerging 
African nations and Western Europe.
198
  The vice president also argued that through student 
exchanges American “ideals…aspirations… traditions…institutions” could be communicated to 
intelligent African youth and that a “great advance in common understanding” could be achieved 
as well, a theme which was included in NSC 5719/1.
199
  Other aspects of NSC 5719/1 display 
many of Nixon’s concerns and recommendations for American-African relations.  Of note is the 
section in NSC 5719/1 which focuses on the balancing act the United States must perform in 
regards to nations seeking independence from their European colonisers.  The document advised 
that premature independence would be as detrimental for emerging nations and “our [American] 
interests” as continuing the rule of the colonial powers, but stressed the need to tailor attitudes to 
each emerging nation appropriately.
200
  The document also portrayed the Soviet Union as an 
expanding colonial power, and Western Europe as a contracting colonial power.
201
  These and 
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other recommendations made in NSC 5719/1 closely mirror the advice Nixon offered in his 
report to Eisenhower on Africa. 
During his mission to Africa, Nixon showed no lack of concern for Communism; 
however, it is clear that expanding and solidifying American influence in the long term was also 
a top priority.  Factors such as regional stability and aiding in Middle East security were integral 
pieces of the New Look and strong themes within NSC 5719/1, but it is important to note that 
NSC 5719/1 made clear that even with American aid, problems in several African nations would 
take “a generation or more” to be resolved.202  Given that the New Look was itself a long-term 
plan for the Cold War, it should not be surprising that another long-term plan was created for 
African nations seen as viable targets for the East/West struggle.  Since Nixon made 
recommendations which were designed to grant immediate as well as enduring benefits to 
America, Western Europe, and those African nations involved, it is fair to state that while anti-
Communism was a driving factor behind his recommendations, the potential for lasting 
American influence in the region was also present. 
 Many of the criticisms Nixon made of Eisenhower’s policies and actions in Africa 
indicate that the vice president was pushing the administration to more fully apply its New Look 
(and anti-Nasserist) objectives.  While contributing significantly to the Eisenhower 
administration’s foreign policies in Africa, Nixon’s mission also demonstrated his development 
into a more confident and pragmatic statesman.  During Nixon’s 1958 mission to Latin America, 
the vice president levelled additional criticisms against the Eisenhower administration for not 
adhering closely enough to the New Look policy.  
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Chapter Three:  Latin America 1958 
“…the Goodwill mission ended with the calling out of U.S. marines and army”203 
In 1958, Vice President Nixon visited several nations on his Latin American mission, 
including Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia.  His trips to Peru and 
Venezuela, however, were the most significant and the most sensational.  In these two nations, 
Nixon was confronted by officials and angry protestors who were dissatisfied with the policies of 
the Eisenhower administration.  The diplomatic incidents in Peru, and especially Venezuela, 
demonstrated Nixon’s growing sophistication as a statesman and the heavy-handed nature with 
which the Eisenhower administration often dealt with Latin American nations.  
Nixon’s mission revealed significant problems in the Eisenhower administration’s 
approach to Latin America.  As was the case with Africa, the vice president argued that U.S. 
policies were partly to blame for communist gains in Latin America.  As a result of his mission 
to the region, the vice president became convinced that Eisenhower’s policies were not lining up 
with the goals of the New Look.  Therefore, he made recommendations which were designed to 
change these policies and improve U.S. relations with various countries in Latin America. 
The Eisenhower administration made clear early in its tenure that under the New Look, 
the Monroe Doctrine was alive and well and the Good Neighbour Policy dead and gone.
204
  In 
1954, the Eisenhower administration ordered the C.I.A. to launch a coup against Guatemala’s 
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President Arbenz, a man considered by the Eisenhower administration to represent the “first 
Soviet beachhead” in Latin America.205  While there was evidence of Arbenz having connections 
to the Soviet Union, the extent and depth of these connections are difficult to discern.
206
  Less 
difficult to discern is the irritation Arbenz caused with his land reform policies and moves 
against the United Fruit Company, which angered American businessmen, the Eisenhower 
administration in general, and the Dulles brothers.
207
  While the factors which led to, and allowed 
for, the coup belie a simple explanation, the Eisenhower administration was convinced of the 
necessity to overthrow Arbenz despite outcry and protests from many Latin American diplomats 
the U.S. had previously courted.
208
 
Historians have suggested that much like its policies in Africa, the Eisenhower 
administration attempted to maintain a simple, status quo approach in Latin America until a 
Communist threat arose.  Bevan Sewell convincingly argues that the Soviet Economic Offensive 
of 1956, an outpouring of Soviet resources to any Latin American nations willing to accept them, 
also caused the Eisenhower administration to have greater sensitivity to foreign actions in Latin 
American nations where anti-American sentiment was perceived to be high; the prospect of a 
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Soviet beachhead in the Western hemisphere was viewed as a threat.
209
  Indeed, the Operations 
Coordinating Board contended that in light of the Soviet Union’s overtures to Latin America, the 
policies which the National Security Council had in place would be inadequate to meet the 
established objectives of the Eisenhower administration in Latin America.
210
  As Michael 
Kryzanek points out, John Foster Dulles had shown concerns about Communist influences in 
Latin America at least as early as 1952, thus open evidence of Soviet plans to become involved 
in the region would certainly have caused alarm.
211
  
Historians have also argued that the Eisenhower administration was quite willing to 
interfere with Latin American nations’ self-determination if the administration perceived a 
Communist threat.  Matthew Loayza contends that Eisenhower was not merely fending off the 
outside threat of Communist infiltration in Latin America, but was also wary of any form of 
nationalism and utilised a kind of altered Monroe Doctrine in which the administration involved 
itself in Latin American affairs not only to keep outside influences out, but to repress any 
internal, left leaning, influences which might hamper “free trade.”212  Loayza portrays the 
Eisenhower administration as economically and politically domineering, working to control and 
guide the course of Latin American nations and often refusing to listen to requests for alteration 
to economic programs.
213
  Stephen Rabe argues that the Eisenhower administration’s goals in 
Latin America were often as simple as anti-Communism.  As Acting Secretary of State Christian 
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Herter pointed out, the key question in Latin America was always, “is the country on our 
side?”214   
Nixon’s impact and input on the development of Eisenhower’s Latin American policies is 
often simplified by historians.  Rabe argues that the attacks on Nixon in Peru and Venezuela by 
angry protestors spurred greater spending on Latin America by the Eisenhower administration.
215
 
Sewell further posits that Richard Nixon’s entire 1958 mission to Latin America, but particularly 
the attacks on him, served as part of the catalyst for the Eisenhower administration to adapt its 
policies towards the continent.
216
  Loayza dismisses the importance Rabe and others attach to the 
assassination attempt by protestors on Nixon in Caracas, dubbed the “Caracas Incident,” insofar 
as it related to policy changes as “exaggerated.”217  While these historians all emphasise the 
impact of the attacks in Venezuela, their analyses tend to ignore Nixon’s role as a statesman, his 
response to the attacks, and the implications of Eisenhower administration’s response to the 
Caracas Incident. 
Eisenhower’s desire to address the criticism of Latin American protestors and Democrats 
in the U.S. that his administration openly supported dictators in Latin America was a key reason 
for Nixon’s mission to Latin America.218  This objective necessitated Nixon’s attendance at 
President Arturo Frondizi’s inauguration, on May 1, in Buenos Aires.219  The Eisenhower 
administration very much wanted to display the U.S.’s support for the new leader in order to 
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distance itself from the deposed Juan Perón, who the administration had also supported.
220
  
Frondizi’s Argentina was only one of Nixon’s destinations on his mission, and he was 
comparatively well-received there, whereas in Peru and Venezuela Nixon was confronted with 
angry and violent protestors.  Marvin Zahniser and W. Michael Weis propose that Nixon being 
sent to such places is evidence of “questionable” judgment on the parts of Eisenhower and 
Dulles, as the administration was aware of anti-American sentiments in both nations.
221
  This 
proposal has merit, but, it is also possible that Eisenhower and Dulles were either unaware of the 
severity of the anti-American sentiments or grossly under-estimated them.
222
   
Nixon was sent on the mission to Latin America after Roy Rubottom Jr., Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, was able to convince Eisenhower and Dulles that 
the perceived indifference of the Eisenhower administration to Latin America’s most recent 
economic and political problems was creating a rift between the U.S. and its Latin American 
allies that “the Communists” might fill.223  The economic problems included a considerable drop 
in the price of Latin American exports to which the Eisenhower administration responded by 
contemplating tariffs and offering financial advice, while the political problems were made up of 
general political unrest combined with the recent overthrow of dictators in Peru and 
Venezuela.
224
  While Eisenhower’s role in the formation, execution, and consideration of 
Nixon’s mission was sporadic, Dulles played a significant role. 
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Rubottom first conceived of the mission, but it was the secretary of state who firmly 
proposed the mission to Nixon, and Dulles’s actions in this capacity, as well as during and after 
the mission, are significant.  Although Nixon dismissed the initial prospect of the Latin America 
mission when it was suggested in an abstract form by Rubottom, he was less able to dismiss 
Dulles’s more concrete proposal, and the “wondering” of President Eisenhower, and 
Eisenhower’s Latin American expert and brother Milton.225  When Dulles first contacted Nixon 
regarding the possibility of a mission to Latin America, he attempted to parry a possible repeat of 
Nixon’s 1957 manoeuvre of expanding the itinerary.  Dulles made clear that “we,” hinting at 
himself and Eisenhower, endorsed the plan, and that he had included a proposed itinerary 
designed to “extract maximum advantages from a foreign policy standpoint.”226   
Dulles went on to explain why Nixon should visit the nations Dulles and Eisenhower 
proposed.  The secretary of state noted that Uruguay was recommended in order to show the 
Uruguayan government “the importance that we accord to that country,” and made other such 
justifications.
227
  Dulles recommended Nixon visit Venezuela “because of the recent 
revolution…and also because of the special economic and strategic interests we have there” 
[emphasis mine].
228
  The revolution Dulles mentioned saw the overthrow of Venezuela’s Marcos 
Perez Jimenez, in January of 1958.  Jimenez, one of the men Nixon characterised as a “refugee 
dictator,” had been awarded the American Legion of Merit in 1956, the highest honour open to 
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non-American citizens.
229
  The Eisenhower administration was again eager to distance itself 
from the image of supporting an overthrown dictator, and thus Nixon’s mission to Venezuela 
was designed to show America’s support for the new leading military junta.  The special 
economic and strategic interests mentioned by Dulles referred to Venezuela’s oil resources, over 
which America enjoyed a significant amount of control, and hoped to continue to enjoy.
230
  The 
presumption that Venezuelan and Latin American resources were simply there for America’s 
taking and would remain that way was borne out in NSC 6009, which examined the ability of 
Latin America to serve as a supply base for America should the U.S. be attacked in a nuclear 
conflict.
231
  Such a report could not have been compiled unless the U.S. expected to continue to 
exert significant control over Latin American nations. 
A similar situation existed in Peru, which had thrived under the dictatorship of Manuel 
Odria during the early 1950s.  After the faltering of Peru’s resource-export based economy 
following the end of the Korean War, however, Odria, also a Legion of Merit recipient, held 
elections and lost power.
232
  Whereas during Odria’s reign Peru had prospered along with many 
American companies based there, during Odria’s fall and the subsequent presidency of Manuel 
Prado, Peruvians blamed Odria’s pro-American policies, those same American companies, and 
the Eisenhower administration for Peru’s ailments.233 
                                                          
229
 David F. Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side:  The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 
(Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 184. 
230
 Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” Political Science 
Quarterly 101, No. 3 (1986), 468. 
231
 “Capabilities of Latin America as a Supply Base in the Event of a Nuclear Attack on the United States,” Prepared 
by Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, May 27, 1960, Cover Memo, Box 28, Policy Paper Subseries, NSC Series, 
WHO, OSANSA, DDEL. 
232
 McClintlock and Vallas, Cooperation at a Cost, 19. 
233
 McClintlock and Vallas, Cooperation at a Cost, 19. 
63 
 
Still, the very fact that Dulles took the time to prepare and explain a detailed itinerary, in 
combination with the secretary of state’s later attempts to dissuade Eisenhower from forming 
new Latin American policies based on Nixon’s recommendations, suggests that Dulles was 
trying to assert a greater level of control over Nixon due to the vice president’s expanding role in 
foreign policy.
234
  It was not uncommon for Dulles to encourage Nixon at one time but then 
attempt to rein him in if Dulles believed Nixon was crossing into areas the secretary of state 
believed to be outside of the vice president’s purview.235  Nixon accepted the mission, 
considering it an opportunity for information gathering, but the conclusions this information led 
the vice president to brought he and Dulles into stark disagreement.
236
 
Nixon’s conversations with various Peruvian officials contributed significantly to his 
understanding of problems Latin Americans had with American policies.  During a meeting with 
Peruvian labour leaders on May 7, 1958, in Lima, Nixon received candid and often critical 
opinions of the United States.  Nixon was told about the relief the Peruvian Mining Federation 
felt after the Eisenhower administration finally decided against tariffs on lead and zinc exports 
from Peru; the speaker also hinted that when the U.S. simply informed Latin American nations 
about such possible economic actions without considering the effect they would have on nations 
such as Peru, this created discontent.
237
  This discontent was demonstrated through aggressive 
protests during Nixon’s public outings in Peru.  The protests Nixon encountered in Peru involved 
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large crowds chanting “Fuera Nixon” (Get out Nixon), “Muera Nixon” (Death to Nixon), and 
eventually protestors began spitting on Nixon and his party.
238
  While the protestors were clearly 
directing their anger at Nixon, the anger itself had its base in economic problems for which many 
Latin Americans believed America held the blame. 
Such problems had been building in Peru and other Latin American nations for some 
time.  The Eisenhower administration’s consideration of tariffs against Latin American trade 
goods contributed to the problems of the often vulnerable economies of countries such as 
Peru.
239
  Feelings of resentment and of being ignored had been growing among many Latin 
Americans not in the upper class.
240
  The frankness of the labour leaders who spoke to Nixon 
was made clear by the complaint and recommendation of another labour leader, Santiago 
Tamaria.  According to Tamaria, private foreign investment from the U.S., such as that of the 
International Petroleum Company, was a fine idea, but would not solve all of Latin America’s 
problems, especially if the U.S. refused to place some manner of control over the American 
companies that invested in Latin America only to exploit its citizens.
241
   
Tamaria’s criticism touched on three key issues which resonated with Nixon.  The most 
obvious factor is that the criticism went against the basic policy of the Eisenhower administration 
that private investment would solve Latin America’s economic issues.242  Tamaria also pointed 
out that foreign investment often resulted in the American companies involved abusing workers’ 
rights.  In addition, he implicitly chastised the Peruvian government for not protecting citizens 
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from exploitation.
243
  Specific to this meeting, the labour leaders brought up American 
companies’ refusing to allow labourers to form unions, and forcing those in unions to strike for 
excessive periods for already-promised wage increases.
244
  Strikingly, Nixon did not argue with 
these men, but listened intently, only sometimes explaining American actions when he believed a 
valid reason or counter-point existed.  When a labour spokesman recommended that the United 
States should support democratic nations in Latin America rather than dictatorships, the vice 
president took it under advisement.
245
   
Although Nixon’s time in Peru had been disturbed by protestors, for the most part the 
vice president was able to safely proceed with his pre-arranged schedule.  In Venezuela, 
however, the situation was much different.  The infamous “Caracas Incident” occurred on May 
13, 1958, when, upon arriving in the capital city, Richard and Pat Nixon were first spat on by 
protestors at the airport, and then subsequently attacked by a mob of an estimated four thousand 
Venezuelans as the Nixons’ police escort abandoned their motorcade.  As Nixon’s party 
proceeded, the Venezuelans shouted the same slogans as protestors Nixon had encountered in 
other Latin American nations, like Peru.  After nearly having their cars flipped over and set on 
fire, the vice president and his party narrowly escaped with minor injuries, but further attempts at 
assassination were planned, and Nixon’s party spent the remainder of their visit in the embassy 
under tight guard.
246
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The junta in charge of the Venezuelan government was understandably embarrassed by 
their inability to assure their guests’ safety, but not so embarrassed that they arrived on time for 
their call on Nixon at the embassy.
247
  When the junta and President Larrazabal finally arrived, 
hat in hand, Nixon dismissed their apologies.  If left unchecked, he argued, Communist 
subversion and violence could engulf the nation.
248
  Claiming to be too “dispirited” to deal with 
the situation beyond apologising profusely, President Larrazabal raised Nixon’s ire even more.249   
While Nixon was insulted and incensed by the Venezuelan government’s inability to 
ensure his party’s safety, the reaction of the Eisenhower administration, in its preparation for a 
rescue mission, was altogether more aggressive.  The flurry of activity which occurred within the 
Eisenhower administration in the immediate wake of the Caracas Incident provides important 
insight into the attitudes of those in the Eisenhower administration.  When news of the 
dispatching of American naval forces to Venezuela was leaked to the press by an unknown 
source, Venezuelan officials complained to their American counterparts, that such an act might 
be enough to topple their “shaky” government.250  Meanwhile, John Foster Dulles made several 
phone calls requesting clarification of the situation in Caracas, and the state of Nixon’s safety.251  
In addition, the president demanded that Venezuelan officials be informed that if there was “any 
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doubt” about Nixon’s safety or the ability of the Venezuelans to assure it, Eisenhower expected 
the Venezuelans to request assistance from America.
252
   
The forces prepared by the U.S. to rescue Richard Nixon were more than sufficient to 
carry out the mission.  On May 13, Admiral Arleigh Burke put in motion a plan for at least five 
hundred marines as well as relevant naval transport to be dispatched towards Venezuela.
253
  The 
movement of the five hundred marines involved twenty-two C-130 troop carrier planes, and an 
additional ten C-124 Globemaster planes transported jeeps, helicopters, and “other airborne 
combat equipment” to the staging base, Ramey Air Force Base, in Puerto Rico.254  If these forces 
proved inadequate or were in need of reinforcements, more troops and the materiel necessary to 
make them combat operational were on standby at the same base, while other troops were 
prepped at Guantanamo Bay.
255
   
These additional forces indicate that the Eisenhower administration’s military was 
preparing for the possibility of ground combat, as reinforcements would be unnecessary unless 
resistance was met or casualties experienced.
256
  The fact that the U.S. Air Force was prepared 
for what could have been either an aggressive show of military force or an actual bombing run 
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on the capital city of a foreign nation displays the extent of power the Eisenhower administration 
was willing to exercise.  The more offensive aircraft included twelve F-100 Super Sabres, a 
fighter-bomber on standby “for immediate combat deployment,” and forty-five of the Strategic 
Air Command’s (SAC) B-47 bombers, all readied at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base for a “show-
of-force demonstration or…whatever the need required.”257  Such aircraft could literally bomb 
Caraquenians should they attempt to assault Nixon again, but could also simply demonstrate this 
ability with a fly-over.   
While obviously not sympathetic to the protestors who had attacked him, Nixon’s 
analysis of the situation in Venezuela pointed out that such aggressive actions by the Eisenhower 
administration would only play into the Communists’ hands.  Nixon did not forgive the actions 
of the protestors who had attacked his party, but his explanation for the attacks illustrated his 
growing ability to distinguish between Communism and anti-Americanism.  After returning to 
the United States, Nixon argued that Communists had organized and led the protests which 
attacked him in Caracas.  According to Nixon, certain nations were “naïve” to the effects of 
Communist influence.
258
  In the vice president’s view, however, the vast majority of the 
protestors he encountered in Venezuela were not rabid Communists but rather angry citizens 
with legitimate political and economic grievances with the United States.  An argument made by 
Nixon well after the mission nicely summarised how he explained the Caracas Incident:  “the 
Communists spearheaded the attack.  But you have to remember they had a lot of willing spear-
carriers.”259   
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Reporting to members of the NSC, Nixon explained that the Venezuelans would “rather” 
[emphasis mine] be friends with America than Russia, but that American policies made this 
difficult.
260
  In particular, he emphasised problematic American polices such as the harbouring of 
“refugee dictators” who had fled Latin America and found a safe haven in the U.S, and American 
price controls on commodities.
261
  While Nixon in no way discounted the Communist influence 
in the protests, the fact that he admitted American fault and argued that without different policies 
such anti-American sentiments would only grow, displays yet again Nixon’s developing 
sophistication as a statesman.   
Nixon contended that problematic political and economic policies on the part of the 
Eisenhower administration were more to blame for anti-American sentiment than Communist 
overtures.  The vice president argued that the Eisenhower administration should strive to raise 
the standard of living of the general populace, or “masses,” of Latin America.262  One of Nixon’s 
criticisms of the Eisenhower’s foreign policies in Latin America focused on the tendency within 
the administration to ignore the impact of policies, such as restrictions on crude oil, which solely 
benefitted Americans and Latin American elites.
263
  The vice president took this criticism a step 
further when he argued that the U.S. ought to take actions which at least did not portray the 
Eisenhower administration as focusing American resources on the prosperity of the “privileged” 
in Latin America.
264
  Nixon made a point of explaining to Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft 
Benson that American businessmen in Latin America did very little to “mingle” with Latin 
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Americans.
265
  Thus, Nixon was clearly keen on pointing out flaws in American economic 
policies in Latin America at the time of his mission.
266
   
Nixon also parroted the criticisms made by the Peruvian labour leaders he had met with 
during his trip.  When the vice president addressed the National Security Council after returning 
from his mission, on May 16, 1958, he argued that “various economic policies such as…tariffs, 
and proposed legislation on lead, zinc, copper, etc.” needed to be addressed but were not as 
important as other political policies such as supporting dictators on the continent.
267
   
While Nixon acknowledged that supporting such dictators as Jimenez while they were in 
power was better than Communist rule, he had also clearly caught on to the fact that many Latin 
Americans had been alienated and antagonised as a result of Eisenhower’s supporting 
dictators.
268
  It is significant that Nixon’s suggestion to support democratically elected 
governments in Latin America wherever possible, and support dictators only when necessary, 
was not only a novel idea but one that met with much resistance from John Foster Dulles and his 
brother.
269
 
The Dulles brothers both disagreed with Nixon’s interpretations of the problems in Latin 
America, but to varying degrees and for different reasons.  Allen Dulles, head of the C.I.A. and 
brother of John Foster Dulles, made several remarks in regards to the aftermath of Nixon’s 
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mission which demonstrated a refusal to accept the more complex situation proposed by Nixon.  
Allen Dulles stated that the governments of Venezuela and Peru had awoken “at last, to the 
extent of the Communist menace.”270  Allen Dulles confirmed that the attacks on Nixon had 
almost toppled the Venezuelan government, as internal strife over the embarrassment led 
military leaders to question the abilities of the ruling junta.
271
  Most interesting is that despite the 
fact that the information Dulles presented to the NSC showed that of the close to one hundred 
protestors arrested by Venezuelan authorities in connection with the protests, only twelve were 
Communists, Dulles still believed Communist actions were at the heart of the riot.
272
  Still, Allen 
Dulles recognised that the Communist instigators were taking advantage of an existing feeling of 
anger among Latin Americans.
273
   
In contrast to Nixon, Secretary Dulles was uncomfortable with the idea that the 
Eisenhower administration might have to alter its support of dictatorships in Latin America.  
When the possibility of withholding support from dictators was raised, John Foster Dulles 
attempted to bog down policy changes with semantics.  The secretary of state contended that 
Nixon’s suggestion that the Eisenhower administration should attempt to support democracy in 
the lower and middle classes was “complicated.”274  If given enough power, Dulles argued, the 
lower classes “will bring in more of a dictatorship of the masses.”275  The secretary also stated 
privately that it was “presumptuous” of Nixon to “think he has all the answers” after being in 
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Latin America for only a “couple of days.”276  As well, Dulles told Nixon directly that there were 
a “whole series of gradations” of dictators, apparently meaning that some were less problematic 
for the U.S. to deal with than others.
277
  In the end, the secretary of state was not the victor in this 
contest, as Eisenhower eventually shifted the administration’s policies in Latin America to 
reflect Nixon’s recommendations more than Dulles’s.278  Based on Nixon’s advice, the 
Eisenhower administration worked not only to increase aid to Latin American countries such as 
Venezuela, but also to work with institutions such as the World Bank to increase the availability 
of loans.
279
  
While Nixon’s economic recommendations are important, another aspect of his 
recommendations display a form of continuity from previous missions, and this is important as 
regards his development as a statesman.  At the conclusion of Nixon’s missions to both Africa 
and Latin America, he strongly supported student exchange programs.  After being accosted 
multiple times by students during his Latin America mission it is perhaps not surprising that 
Nixon spoke on the need for greater exchanges.  That he argued such student exchanges should 
at a minimum be doubled shows the premium he placed on such programs.
280
  Whether the vice 
president believed that exposure to American culture would convince anti-American or 
Communist students to change their minds, or that sending more American students to such 
nations would create goodwill among their citizens, or that expanding such programs would be 
good publicity, or some combination of these, are valid questions.  However, it is more important 
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here to note that by 1958, Richard Nixon was espousing a cultural means to achieve American 
ends in the Cold War. 
From reluctantly accepting the Latin American mission to becoming a critic of the 
problems with the Eisenhower administration’s policies in Latin America over the course of a 
few months, Nixon’s interest in Latin American matters obviously fluctuated.  When labour 
officials in Peru complained to Nixon of unfair American economic practices, or when he 
encountered students, protestors, and would-be assassins, all accusing the Eisenhower 
administration of supporting tyrannical dictators, Nixon made the decision to not simply dismiss 
these problems as Communist-inspired subversion.  The U.S.’s near invasion of Venezuela, 
which came after the attack on Nixon, beyond irritating the vice president, provided more 
evidence that the Eisenhower administration was not paying enough attention to the 
repercussions of its actions and policies in Latin America.
281
 
By 1958, Nixon was comfortable placing blame on the Eisenhower administration for 
foreign policy shortfalls.  The vice president pointed out that if, in attempting to fulfill the New 
Look’s objective of defending America and the non-Communist world’s “free institutions and 
fundamental values,” the administration was willing to enact policies which sacrificed or 
subjugated the free institutions and fundamental values of Latin American nations, then those 
policies needed to be changed.
282
  While still clearly working to defeat Communism, Nixon 
argued in favour of more nuanced economic and political foreign policies in Latin America.  In 
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1959, Nixon travelled to the Soviet Union, where his development and sophistication as a 
statesman were displayed and tested.   
 
 
  
75 
 
Chapter Four:  The Soviet Union 1959 
Bringing the Cold War Home 
In the summer of 1959, Richard Nixon travelled to the Soviet Union on a mission 
designed to display American culture and society to Soviet citizens.  While the New Look did 
not make specific mention of the cultural exchanges Nixon often pushed for, or exhibitions of the 
type Nixon travelled to the U.S.S.R. to promote, the policy did endorse taking “overt and covert 
measures to discredit Soviet prestige.”283  Exchanges, exhibitions, and other such programs 
became yet another battleground in the propaganda and cultural struggle between the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R.  The importance placed on these programs should not be underestimated, as beyond 
their use to “further international understanding,” the exchanges and exhibitions were potent 
weapons of propaganda.
284
 
The 1959 American National Exhibition (ANE) in Moscow was the U.S. response to the 
Soviet National Exhibition in New York that same year.  A keen awareness of the possible 
propaganda gains, both at home and abroad, contributed to the now famous “Kitchen Debate” 
between Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev at the ANE.  While this squabble is the most 
well-known event of Nixon’s mission, it was only one, very public, indicator of the intense 
planning, preparation, and power-jockeying that would occur before, during, and after the 
mission.  The vice president’s mission to the Soviet Union was an opportunity to initiate, 
advance, resolve, and muddle talks on a variety of topics including nuclear arms, cultural 
exchanges, technology, and espionage.   
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Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1959 were, as ever, 
complex.  While tensions continued to rise over the state of Berlin and the two Germanys, Soviet 
officials such as First Deputy Chairman Anastas Mikoyan toured the United States and 
publically praised their Cold War rivals.
285
  Concerns over nuclear weapons also continued to 
dog both governments and arguments over test-bans, arms control, and other issues remained 
contentious.
286
  While the planned meetings and tours of high-level officials point to the 
appearance of a greater willingness to communicate, both the American and Soviet governments 
were still quick to distrust the intentions of the other.
287
 
Cold War historians undertaking cultural studies often touch on Nixon’s 1959 mission to 
the Soviet Union.  Both Yale Richmond and Nicholas Cull deal with the vice president’s 
mission, but neither offer in depth analysis.
288
  Walter Hixson examines the entire mission, 
exploring the use of the “Kitchen Debate” and other events such as the ANE as propaganda.289  
However, Hixson’s study is often isolated from consideration of the political context, and of the 
ANE’s implications as an expression of the New Look.290  The debate and the mission have also 
been portrayed by historians such as Richmond, Marilyn Kushner, and Victor Rosenberg as 
symbolising a giant leap forward in the erosion of Soviet cultural controls, as events which 
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occurred only after heated domestic debates over art, and as hard fought diplomatic and cultural 
victories for both the Soviets and Americans.
291
  Thus, by examining both the cultural and 
political elements involved in the preparation and execution of Nixon’s mission, it is possible to 
understand not only the foreign policy manoeuvres of the Eisenhower administration, but also to 
more fully understand Nixon’s development as a statesman in 1959. 
Just before leaving for his mission Nixon had a meeting with Eisenhower on July 22, 
during which the vice president displayed a significant level of confidence and control, and was 
shown to have the trust of the president as well.  Nixon asked Eisenhower at several points for 
simple “definitions,” such as Eisenhower’s definition of “progress,” in order to not overstep his 
mandate and to be more able to communicate to Khrushchev the president’s mindset should the 
opportunity arise.
292
  At one point during the conversation, Eisenhower directed the vice 
president to keep the conversations with Soviet officials, “cordial, almost light.”293  However, 
when Nixon responded that he planned to forcefully debate and counter Khrushchev, the 
president agreed.
294
  Indeed, Eisenhower advised Nixon “not to be afraid to talk substantive 
matters…in his conversations with Khrushchev.”295 
The vice president was prepared to discuss serious issues with the Soviet leader, but he 
was also equipped to meet Khrushchev’s anticipated boasting with aggressive messages.  During 
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his time in Moscow, Nixon was armed with statements prepared at the order of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.  One such statement is indicative of the tone of the others:   
Military opinion in the U.S. is divided on the adequacy of its [the U.S.’s] 
retaliatory power.  One group maintains it is entirely adequate to destroy all 
targets in in the Soviet Union with a large margin for error.  The other group feels 
it is adequate to destroy all those targets 10 times over.
296
 
Other statements included an assurance for the Soviets that while America would not 
start the next war this did not mean it would not drop the first nuclear bomb, a threat to arm 
smaller nations with nuclear weapons, and several statements which simply mocked the Soviet 
Union on the basis of its economy and “low education.”297  Nixon utilising any such statements 
would very likely have created problems rather than solutions in his arguments with Khrushchev, 
and the vice president chose not to make use of any of them.   
 While preparing for his mission to the Soviet Union, the vice president made certain that 
he had as much information on a multitude of topics as possible.  This included background 
checks of the American personnel that would be accompanying him who he was not familiar 
with.  While some of these checks were requested by Nixon or one of his staff members, others 
were conducted on the initiative of, and were personally supervised by J. Edgar Hoover, Director 
of the F.B.I.  These reports were often sent directly to Nixon by special messenger.
298
  The 
background checks conducted on the personnel accompanying Nixon to the U.S.S.R. not only 
display the level of concern within the F.B.I. for Communist sympathisers, they also demonstrate 
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the extents to which Nixon, through his enlistment of Hoover’s resources, was willing to go in 
order to prepare for his mission.   
Hoover brought personal and often embarrassing moments from the past to Nixon’s 
attention.  Foy David Kohler, a current Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and 
former director of the Voice of America program, was portrayed by Hoover as a bumbling fool, 
if not a Communist sympathiser, due to Kohler’s arrest for driving while intoxicated in 1952, 
after which Kohler’s also intoxicated wife made several pro-Soviet comments.299  While some 
reports vindicated certain personnel, other personnel, such as Leonard J. Hankin, were not as 
fortunate.  Leonard Hankin had a history of left-leaning associations which were suspicious 
enough for Hoover to make personal comments to Nixon via letters, wherein Hoover provided 
interpretation of the F.B.I.’s information arguing for a connection between Hankin and problems 
or “controversy” attached to the mission.300   
Hoover’s attempts to sway the vice president’s opinion are important more for what they 
indicate about the importance attached to Nixon’s mission than what they reveal about Hoover’s 
tactics.  Hoover informed Nixon that Robert Dowling, the man essentially in charge of the city of 
New York’s representation at the ANE, had had a romantic relationship with a “second secretary 
at the Soviet Embassy,” was once passed over for a position due to political reasons, and thought 
John Foster Dulles was “stupid,” before finally informing Nixon that Dowling had also 
conducted information exchanges with Soviets in Moscow, and thus considered Dowling unfit to 
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be in close proximity to Nixon.
301
  Whatever Hoover’s biases were, he was attempting to rid the 
American mission of those who were or could be manipulated by Soviet agents.  Nixon did 
follow up on at least one of the personnel that Hoover provided information on, but it was not the 
man with the most glaring Communist sympathies.
302
   
  Nixon requested more information on Hankin rather than Dowling.  This information, 
essentially a defence of Hankin provided by the U.S.I.A.’s deputy director, Abbott Washburn, 
mostly defended Hankin, but was labelled as “crap” by General Robert E. Cushman, Nixon’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs.
303
  Since Hankin had been investigated and trained by the 
C.I.A.’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), the U.S.I.A. believed Hankin 
could not have hidden Communist sympathies.  However, Cushman argued that “many an OSS 
[sic] was a left wing pinko and worse, I’ve known of some.”304  Still, it is interesting that while 
Hoover’s focus was on rooting out Communist sympathisers from Nixon’s mission, the vice 
president’s focus was on removing possible sources of controversy, such as that which had 
surrounded some of the artists involved in the art exhibit.
305
   
One of the difficulties in Nixon’s mission to the Soviet Union was that while Nixon’s 
meeting with Khrushchev was certain to be the highlight for the vice president, the mission itself 
occurred during the American National Exhibition, which opened in Moscow on July 24, 1959.  
As the exhibition was funded by the U.S. government, Nixon was not in direct control of the 
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contents of the Exhibition.  However, the vice president did attempt to exert some control over 
what was exhibited.  A section of the ANE was devoted to examples of American art.  Whereas 
much of the ANE was devoted to domestic technology and the material advantages of capitalism, 
and was thus less scrutinized by government officials for its deeper meaning, the art that had 
been sent for display at the exhibition was not as easily accepted.  Great controversy arose in the 
lead-up to the opening of the exhibition when it was found that at least twenty-two of the sixty-
seven artists whose pieces would be displayed had strong connections with Communism.
306
  
What began as a debate over the soundness of including art crafted by artists with Communist 
leanings quickly escalated into an argument regarding which kind of art was best suited to thwart 
the Communists’ drive to destroy American culture.307   
During a telephone conversation with the new Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, 
Nixon argued that the entire art exhibit should be withdrawn from the ANE.  The reasons he 
gave to Herter hinted that the vice president was uncomfortable labelling the proposed works 
“typical” of American art.308  Nixon indicated that he wanted avoid the questions he anticipated 
would result from displaying such art.
309
  Herter, however, convinced the vice president, that the 
U.S. government should not be “in the business” of censoring art.310  In the end, the art exhibit 
went ahead as planned with minor additions rather than removals.  Nonetheless, the debate 
demonstrates the sensitivity felt by both Nixon and the American government concerning the 
inherent hazards of any and all things Communist.  Considered together with Nixon’s 
interactions with Hoover and the F.B.I., the level of involvement Nixon took in this mission 
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becomes clear; the vice president was not only researching various topics, but was also 
attempting to remove issues and people which might create controversy in America or serve as 
an easy target for his Soviet hosts to pick up on, since any aspect of the ANE which might praise 
the Soviet system, or undermine the American one, would be a complication. 
Unfortunately for Nixon, the U.S. Congress passed the Captive Nations 
Proclamation/Resolution and President Eisenhower signed it into law in July 1959.  The Captive 
Nations Proclamation, and Captive Nations Week, which Eisenhower made an annual 
observance starting on July 17, less than a week before Nixon departed for Moscow on July 22, 
called for Americans to study the “plight” of those under Soviet control and to pray for those 
people to achieve freedom.
311
  This resolution caused enough problems for Nixon in dealing with 
Soviet officials that Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson cited it as specifically “hampering” the 
vice president’s progress, arguing that Nixon had to overcome such challenges before addressing 
more pertinent issues.
312
  The president’s brother Milton, a member of the President's Advisory 
Committee on Government Organization and a member of the National Advisory Committee on 
Inter-American Affairs, who Dwight Eisenhower trusted a great deal, argued in a report that the 
Captive Nations Resolution had a wholly negative effect in the Soviet Union both in regards to 
Soviet citizens and officials.
313
  For his part, Nixon complained directly to Eisenhower that every 
                                                          
311
 “President Proclaims Captive Nations Week” New York Times, July 18, 1959, 2.  For Nixon linking his cool 
welcome in Moscow to the Captive Nations Resolution, see Nixon, Memoirs, 254-255. 
312
 Telegram, Llewellyn Thompson to Christian Herter, August 3, 1959, Russian Trip Reports, Series 325 Executive 
Branch File, RNPPC, RNL. 
313
 For one example of Milton being trusted by Ike, in the instance of the mission to Russia, see Rosenberg, Soviet-
American Relations, 1953-1960, 202.  For Milton arguing about the negative impact of the Captive Nations 
Resolution, see Comments by Milton S. Eisenhower on the effect of Vice President Nixon’s mission to the Soviet 
Union and Poland, August, 7, 1959, 4, Russian Trip, Trip Reports, Box 12, Series 325 Executive Branch File, RNPPC, 
RNL. 
83 
 
meeting he had with Soviet officials involved some form of grievance on the part of the Soviets 
regarding the Captive Nations Resolution.
314
   
Khrushchev and Soviet officials came up with many ways to display their displeasure 
with the Resolution.  Other than the very public complaint Khrushchev made to Nixon on July 
24 at the ANE, where Khrushchev literally grabbed a Soviet worker and demanded of Nixon, 
“does this man look like a slave?,” Khrushchev kept most of his displeasure with the Captive 
Nations Resolution relegated to more private discussions with Nixon.
315
  The most dramatic 
display came early on July 26, when during a two and a half-hour motor-boat tour of the 
Moscow River, Khrushchev stopped on eight occasions to gather up people on the shore of the 
river, apparently sunbathers and leisure-seekers, in order to show Nixon the “captive peoples.”316  
Nixon later claimed that this was an elaborate set-up for Khrushchev to “make propaganda,” 
since that section of the river area was reserved for higher-ranking party members.
317
  Whether 
or not Nixon knew the sunbathers were simply a ploy by Khrushchev is not as important as the 
fact that Khrushchev and Soviet officials took the time to prepare for such a seemingly 
spontaneous display.
318
   
First Deputy Chairman Anastas Mikoyan conveyed most clearly how the Soviets felt 
about the Captive Nations Resolution.  In a conversation with Nixon on July 28, 1959, Mikoyan 
expressed confusion as to why the Resolution would be passed just prior to Nixon’s mission, as 
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that would seem “designed to worsen the Vice President’s reception here.”319  The Soviets were 
offended, but also confused as to why the American government would seemingly intentionally 
sabotage a diplomatic mission. 
Nixon’s response was rather clumsy in that he argued that the U.S. Congress was simply 
vocalising the desire of Americans with ethnic backgrounds in Soviet territories to pray for those 
still under Soviet rule, and he also pointed out that Eisenhower’s signed Resolution differed from 
Congress’s in that the president had left out specific references to the Soviet Union.320  Nixon 
finally admitted that if he, Eisenhower, or even Milton Eisenhower, had had the power to keep 
Congress from passing the Captive Nations Resolution, they would have done so.
321
  Rather than 
being able to devote more of his limited time with Khrushchev to topics such as trade, 
technology, cultural exchanges, nuclear weapons, and so on, Nixon was forced time and again to 
address the Captive Nations Resolution.   
 During Nixon’s mission, Khrushchev often displayed an acute sensitivity to criticism of 
the Soviet Union and Communism.  This sensitivity was on display during the Kitchen Debate, 
which occurred on July 24, 1959.  The Kitchen Debate, the name given to an argument which 
arose during Khrushchev’s tour of the American exhibits with Nixon, grants a snap-shot of some 
the anxieties the Soviet Union and the United States felt towards one another at the time.  The 
Kitchen Debate served as an opportunity for Khrushchev and Nixon to air concerns over one 
another’s policies and actions.  That these series of arguments were spontaneous was evident 
throughout the exchange, as both Nixon and Khrushchev were often taken off guard by their 
                                                          
319
 Memcon, Anastas Mikoyan and Richard Nixon, July 28, 1959, 1, Box 7, International Trips and Meetings Series, 
WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary:  Records, 1952-1961, DDEL.  
320
 Memcon, Vice President’s Kremlin Conversation with Khrushchev, July 24, 1959, 2, Russian Trip Conversations 
with Khrushchev, Others, Box 11, Series 325, Executive Branch File, RNPPC, RNL. 
321
 Memcon, Vice President’s Kremlin Conversation with Khrushchev, July 24, 1959, 3, RNPPC, RNL. 
85 
 
rival’s points or questions.322  Walter Hixson has pointed out that both men undertook a great 
deal of preparation and research in anticipation for their meeting.  However, Hixson’s contention 
that the Kitchen Debate and related public arguments between the two were “not as spontaneous 
as they appeared,” is problematic.323  The Kitchen Debate was quite spontaneous, as the heated 
arguments between Khrushchev and Nixon shocked onlookers and members of both Nixon and 
Khrushchev’s retinue.324  This spontaneity meant that occasional uneasiness or insecurity showed 
through each man’s comments.   
The Soviet desire to match and exceed the United States in all matters, from the space 
race to consumer goods, was expressed by Khrushchev several times during his arguments with 
Nixon.  Responding to Nixon’s praise of the “typical American home,” which included many 
amenities unavailable in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev alternately claimed during their 
conversation that the U.S.S.R. already possessed similar technology, or that in a few years they 
would attain it, improve upon it, and then surpass the Americans.
325
  These were not claims that 
Khrushchev made simply to placate or appeal to Soviet audiences, as he made the same claims to 
American audiences two months later.
326
  The Soviets were aware that in many areas they were 
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not as advanced as the Americans, but they contended that the U.S.S. R. would soon meet and 
exceed the U.S. in these areas.   
During the Kitchen Debate, Nixon made a challenge to Khrushchev which expanded the 
scope of the Cold War.  Nixon called for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union to compete with 
America on “the relative merits of washing machines” rather than rockets. This proposal served 
to display the Eisenhower administration’s desire for peaceful competition with the U.S.S.R.327  
The brilliance of this seemingly benign challenge lies in that it dared the Soviets to not just keep 
up with America’s military might, but to attempt to maintain similar standards of living, comfort 
and consumerism.  Indeed, while neither an American nor Soviet citizen would likely boast over 
their nation’s washing machine advancements, an important factor should be kept in mind.  
Nixon’s challenge was designed to not just discredit Soviet prestige but also to inform the Soviet 
citizens of the freedoms and comforts available to the Americans about to be “passed and waved 
goodbye to” by the Soviets.328  With this challenge Nixon placed military and consumer 
achievements on a similar plane; he argued that rocket technology and home appliance 
technology were both viable areas of competition.  Thus, with this challenge, Nixon brought the 
Cold War home.   
Still, both Nixon and Khrushchev usually stuck to their respective governments’ agendas, 
such as the Eisenhower administration’s desire to have greater cultural and psychological access 
to Soviet citizens, and in Nixon’s case this meant forcefully requesting, and arguing a need for, 
fewer restrictions on the flow of information and culture to and from the Soviet Union.  At 
several points during his mission, Nixon voiced concerns which echoed the desire of Eisenhower 
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and the U.S.I.A. for greater access to Soviet citizens, or at least, Soviet airwaves.  Nixon told 
Khrushchev during the preamble to the Kitchen Debate that “we should hear more of you on our 
television, you should hear us more on yours.”329  In its simplest forms, this request can be 
viewed as both the Eisenhower administration stressing the value of cultural exchanges, and as 
Nixon emphasising the difference between America’s strive to spread freedom and the Soviet 
drive to control it, a key part of Eisenhower’s and the U.S.I.A.’s propaganda.330 However, this 
was not simply a reiteration of the greater emphasis being placed on cultural exchange by the 
Eisenhower administration’s New Look, but also Nixon’s way of expressing that by granting 
greater exposure to one another’s leaders, tensions would ease as both sides learned more about 
each other.
331
  This would mean both nations’ citizens would become more acquainted with the 
other’s general way of life in a less censored or controlled fashion.  
 The vice president’s continued support of cultural exchanges before, during, and after the 
mission to the Soviet Union is indicative of an important trait of Nixon’s statesmanship.  After 
his missions to Africa and Latin America, Nixon called for increased student exchanges and the 
expansion of cultural exchange programs.
332
  In conversations with Khrushchev and during his 
radio and television addresses, Nixon argued for an expansion of American-Soviet student and 
cultural exchanges.
333
  However, the vice president’s s vision of these exchanges contrasted 
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starkly with the Soviet leader’s.  Whereas Khrushchev was favourable to increasing the number 
of medical and federal delegations for such exchanges, Nixon believed “people,” meaning well 
educated and influential citizens, exchanges and cultural exchanges like the ANE ought to be 
expanded in tandem with an increase in the number of visits by more professional officials of the 
type mentioned by Khrushchev.
334
   
According to the vice president, such exchanges would help increase understanding 
between the Soviets and Americans, and would also help remove fears, misconceptions, and 
other negative perceptions which might create conflict.  Almost certainly unintentionally, 
Nixon’s mission and the surrounding events had this exact effect on Clarence Francis, a special 
consultant to Eisenhower who accompanied Nixon on the mission.  Francis was clearly not 
impressed by the U.S.S.R. or Russians, labelling the former inefficient and rundown, while 
critiquing the latter by stating that they would “surely…not win many beauty contests.”335  
Regardless, Francis noted having had the exact experience intended by cultural exchanges with 
the Soviets:  “the more I see…the less I fear them.”336  
 In the case of cultural and student exchanges with the Soviet Union, Nixon suggested that 
restrictions be made that had heretofore been absent from his recommendations on the topic.  
The vice president was certainly in favour of expanding exchanges; however, he advised a 
revamped selection process for sending Americans to the Soviet Union.  Nixon argued that many 
Americans were embarrassing themselves in arguments with the “well indoctrinated” Soviet 
citizens, since the Americans were not capable of defending the U.S. “system” with the same 
                                                          
334
 Summary Comparison of Arguments and Recommendations made by Khrushchev and Nixon, “Exchanges,” 
Russian Trip Conversations with Khrushchev, Others, Box 11, Series 325, Executive Branch File, RNPPC, RNL. 
335
 Notes from Russia Trip – July 1960 [sic], 3, Box 9, Clarence Francis:  Papers, 1933-1973, DDEL. 
336
 Notes from Russia Trip, 4, DDEL. 
89 
 
sophistication as the Soviets’ attacks.337  Since the Soviets were sending “their best,” the 
Eisenhower administration ought to lay the groundwork to either send Americans more capable 
of defending the U.S. system or establish a stricter selection process and create briefings for any 
Americans who could be perceived by the Soviets as representatives.
338
  Nixon still supported 
exchange programs, but also understood that the Soviet Union was a unique challenge for such 
initiatives.  
The idea behind expanded and modified exchange programs was that the Western 
lifestyle would be more appealing to Soviet citizens than the Soviet lifestyle would be to 
Westerners, or at least attractive enough to cause them to question the Soviet system.  This was 
supported by information the U.S.I.A. had gathered which found that Soviet citizens enjoyed 
Western-style entertainment and news programs.
339
  That such programs were subject to an 
elaborate and evolving Soviet jamming system, the U.S.I.A. took as further support that the 
Voice of America was a potent psychological weapon.
340
  Nixon was thus aware that unrestricted 
access to the Soviet audience was difficult to gain, and he noted that the verbatim reprinting of 
one of his speeches in Pravda was a “hopeful sign.”341  His report to Eisenhower did not mention 
the decidedly less neutral treatment the rest of his time in the U.S.S.R. received from the same 
magazine.
342
  Thus, while aware of the fact that the Soviets were still exercising tight controls 
over the media within their sphere of influence, Nixon saw it as a positive sign both that the 
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Soviet authorities had kept their word in reprinting his speech unaltered, and that his refutation of 
Soviet attacks on American policies was allowed to reach Soviet citizens.   
That Nixon was at the very least trying to expand and enhance communication between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is striking given that his next notes covered a theme that he repeatedly 
returned to during his mission to the Soviet Union:  the idea of a bi-polar world being inherently 
flawed.  Indeed, Nixon had instructed all of his speechwriters beforehand that they were not to 
write any speeches which contained endorsements of the idea of coexistence.
343
  The vice 
president considered coexistence to be an idea which had a bi-polar world at its core, and thus 
Nixon argued against it.
344
  When he gave his radio speech in Moscow on August 1, Nixon 
labelled coexistence “completely inadequate and negative.”345  Nixon wrote in several notes that 
the perception of “two worlds” was flawed, that there was “no curtain between them,” meaning 
the non-Communist and Communist nations.
346
  Nixon argued that to coexist intrinsically meant 
that two opposite elements were present, and the vice president argued that there was only “one 
world,” and that while “peaceful competition…seems like an impossible dream” there was no 
reason that the differences between the West and the East had to translate to diametric 
opposition.
347
   
While such speeches point to potentially warmer ties between the superpowers, another 
of Nixon’s objectives on his mission was not as openly friendly.  Part of Nixon’s mission was an 
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to attempt to convince Khrushchev that while America planned to continue to test and build 
larger nuclear weapons, and establish and expand military bases abroad, such as in Turkey, such 
actions were not meant as provocations or a prelude to war.
348
  The bases in Turkey were 
especially contentious as they had been used by the United States to maintain America’s position 
in the Middle East, often to the vocal protestations of the Soviets.
349
  Such bases obviously made 
the Soviets nervous for a number of reasons beyond the simple fact that they allowed the United 
States to involve themselves in Middle Eastern politics in an often heavy-handed manner.
350
  The 
proximity of such bases to the U.S.S.R. also worried the Soviets.  Khrushchev argued that since 
the United States had missile launch sites and military bases within three hundred kilometers 
from the U.S.S.R., while the U.S.S.R. was “several thousand kilometers” from the United States, 
continued atomic tests and base expansions would not be conducive to building trust.
351
  Given 
that Khrushchev accused Nixon of conducting espionage during the vice president’s time in the 
U.S.S.R., building trust was sure to be difficult. 
In the course of one conversation on July 26, Nixon utilised Khrushchev’s tendency to 
boast about Soviet military achievements in order to extract useful information which pointed to 
the Soviet military’s technological progress.  During a luncheon that day, Khrushchev 
volunteered specific and intricate details about Soviet rocket and intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) technology; he also volunteered that during a test flight one ICBM had gone 2000 
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kilometres off course and could have landed in Alaska.
352
  When Nixon questioned Khrushchev 
on other weapon-related technology, Khrushchev revealed specific range limitations of certain 
missiles, claimed the Soviet Union was scaling back and hoping to discontinue building bomber-
planes in favour of ICBMs, and asserted that the Soviet Union was building submarines “as fast 
as they [could].”353   
When Nixon commented that submarines were useful as missile-launching platforms, he 
managed to pull Khrushchev into revealing a significant weak spot in Soviet defences.  
Khrushchev responded by stating that land bases were much better for launching missiles since 
sub-based missiles had limited range, and that submarines were more useful for disrupting naval 
functions.
354
  This revealed a weakness in the Soviets’ technology since the United States was 
little more than five months away from launching its first nuclear submarine equipped with 
Polaris missiles. With a range of 1200 nautical miles, the American missiles had the advantages 
of being fireable with the submarine still submerged and, despite the missile’s less than global 
reach, the American Navy believed that 45 Polaris submarines would have the capacity to 
completely destroy Russia.
355
  While Nixon may or may not have been privy to such details 
about the Polaris program, he certainly knew of the program’s existence.356   
Khrushchev’s willingness to divulge Soviet military technology came to a quick halt 
when Nixon pressed him on the issue of missile fuel.  When Khrushchev claimed to be incapable 
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of speaking on the fuel issue, he likely had nothing to boast about, did not know the answer, or, 
for some reason, felt such information should not be freely discussed.  While Khrushchev later 
confused the location where this conversation with Nixon occurred, and absolved himself of any 
responsibility for choosing the topic of the conversation, he remembered Nixon’s question about 
solid fuels, and labelled him a “second-rate spy.”357  Of course, given that Khrushchev often 
announced to Nixon and the American party that he was about to “reveal another secret” before 
doing just that, Nixon’s request for information can hardly be considered peculiar.358  Still, 
Khrushchev’s spy comment was not far from the truth at least as concerns the aspect of 
espionage.   
Nixon had been informed via one of his briefings of the lost opportunity when during 
another of Khrushchev’s boasts, this time to Governor Averell Harriman on June 23, Khrushchev 
had given a monetary value and a date range for the Soviet Union to build enough ICBMs to 
destroy all American and Western European industrial centres.
359
  This briefing noted that 
“unfortunately, Governor Harriman did not follow up with…probing questions,” and went on to 
explain that clarification on exactly what Khrushchev meant when he made such boasts would be 
very useful to American officials.
360
  Indeed, a list of issues that American officials desired 
clarification on vis-à-vis Soviet missile capabilities was given to Nixon; the list included 
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questions on magnitude, production, deployment, and a question specifically about the type of 
fuel the Soviets were using for their missiles.
361
  Thus, it is quite plausible that Nixon was posing 
probing questions because the administration believed the information would be useful.   
During their conversations, Khrushchev and Nixon often fell into the pattern they 
displayed in the Kitchen Debate, one man raising an issue and then both arguing at length only 
abandoning the topic to raise another.  However, during these private conversations the two were 
much more argumentative on specific topics of contention.  For example, a topic raised by 
Khrushchev on July 26 was the issue of elections in Vietnam.  Arguments over Berlin and the 
fate of the two Germanys led to the situation in Vietnam becoming a topic of debate for Nixon 
and Khrushchev.
362
  In 1959, the situation in Vietnam was escalating for all sides:  the United 
States had essentially placed Ngo Din Diem in power in South Vietnam and perpetuated the 
division of the country while the Soviets and Chinese, both providing aid to the North 
Vietnamese, were becoming more divided on the proper course the communists in North 
Vietnam should take.
363
  When the vice president tried to address Khrushchev’s evaluation of the 
situation in Berlin, Khrushchev shouted over Nixon in order to make the point that Vietnam was 
a similar situation in that “there were not two correct answers…only one, and the whole world 
knew that.”364  Khrushchev went on to argue that the United States could not offer up Diem’s 
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refusal to hold elections in Vietnam as the reason for the U.S.’s opposition to elections since 
“everybody knew the West pulled the strings on him.”365   
The vice president’s response to these criticisms was equally revealing of Nixon’s 
opinions on the situation in Vietnam in 1959.  Interesting here is that Nixon responded by asking 
Khrushchev if North Vietnam’s strings were being pulled by “the people,” hinting that the 
United States believed Ho Chi Minh to be a puppet of the Soviets and Chinese.
366
  Nixon also 
argued that the central reason elections had not been held in Vietnam was because of the 
“impossible conditions created there by the Communists.”367  Indeed, both the U.S. and Soviet 
Union suspected the other of controlling the situation on the respective sides of the Vietnam 
border, whereas in truth, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had limited success in directing and 
controlling the South and North Vietnamese leaders.
368
    
 Nixon’s mission to the U.S.S.R. then, was much more than an ideological clash between 
American and Soviet perspectives, an opportunity for the vice president to gain exposure, or yet 
another goodwill mission.  The mission was certainly all of these things, but when one considers 
the extent to which Nixon displayed his development as a statesman, it is obvious that the 
mission was also the culmination of a great deal of preparation for Nixon from the beginning of 
his vice presidency.  From the attempts at removing the art exhibit to the exhaustive background 
checks on those who would be close to him during the mission, Nixon displayed a strong desire 
for control over, and knowledge of, his surroundings.  During his multiple arguments with 
Khrushchev, Nixon listened and countered with consideration, never backing down to 
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Khrushchev.  Just as importantly, Nixon also often simply let Khrushchev speak without 
interruption, jumping in to ask for clarification or to steer Khrushchev towards another topic.   
Nixon’s development as a statesman did not translate into the vice president becoming a 
perfect negotiator.  In 1959, Nixon suffered from one of the same flaws he had previously 
criticised the Eisenhower administration for in that he did not recognise the international 
ramifications of his domestic actions.  During Nixon’s mission to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev 
often sardonically questioned whether the Nixon he was speaking to and who was visiting Russia 
was the same Nixon who made vitriolic anti-Communist speeches in America; the Nixon in 
Moscow was not the vehement anti-Communist the Soviets had expected.
369
  Obviously, Nixon 
could not tell Khrushchev that his domestic anti-Communist speeches to American audiences 
were political performances any more than the vice president could give a speech to Americans 
suddenly extolling the virtues of less hardline approaches, without suffering significant backlash 
and damage.  Nixon recognised this, but the best he could manage was to eventually, in 1960, 
send his then running-mate Henry Cabot Lodge to speak to Khrushchev and tell him not to “pay 
any attention to the…speeches.  Remember, they’re just political statements.”370   
 Nixon’s mission to the U.S.S.R. served a significant purpose for the Eisenhower 
administration.  The ANE definitively proved that Soviet citizens were not only interested in 
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American culture and lifestyle, but that the New Look’s oft-ignored prediction that “popular 
pressures for consumption goods” could play a prominent role in improving Soviet leaders’ 
attitudes towards the U.S. was credible.
371
  The meetings and confrontations between Nixon and 
Khrushchev also served as valuable opportunities to gain information on Soviet intentions and 
sensitivities.  However, given the intense efforts to remove any hint of Communist sympathy or 
leaning from everything involved in the ANE, from the art to those close to Nixon, the anti-
Communist sensitivities of the Eisenhower administration were also evident.  It is obvious that 
Nixon too placed a high value on America’s ability to win the battle on the cultural field of the 
Cold War.   
Nixon’s mission to the Soviet Union, along with the significant involvement from so 
many branches of the Eisenhower administration, including Eisenhower himself, reveals at least 
two important trends.  The first is that the Eisenhower administration was becoming much more 
sophisticated in its approach to psychological warfare, the ANE being essentially wholly 
designed for this purpose.  The second is that despite problematic and often avoidable 
complications, such as the Captive Nations Resolution, the Eisenhower administration was 
committed to presenting the public, both domestically and internationally, with a picture of 
America and the American lifestyle which were peaceful and prosperous.  The vice president’s 
mission to Moscow played a significant part in this, as Nixon emphasised peaceful competition 
not in front of a rocket, tank, or satellite, but in front of a model kitchen.  
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Conclusion 
In 1960, Arthur Schlesinger stated that “[Richard] Nixon has no ideas…[he] stands for 
nothing concrete.”372  As this thesis demonstrates, however, the vice president clearly developed 
ideas about American foreign policies during his missions to Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin 
America, and the Soviet Union.  Indeed, by the end of his time in the Eisenhower administration, 
Nixon stood for something concrete:  the pragmatic, global extension of American influence. 
In 1953, Nixon was new to the vice presidency and still uncertain about what role he 
might play in Eisenhower’s foreign policy.  During his mission to Asia and the Middle East, 
Nixon was careful to closely follow his directives and promote the tenets of the New Look.  At 
this time the vice president’s perspectives and abilities were not as sophisticated as they later 
became. Nixon adhered to John Foster Dulles’s notion that India’s neutralism was at best the 
expression of Nehru’s naïve narcissism, and at worst a ploy which would make the entire region 
more vulnerable to Communism.  Nixon also stuck close to the New Look, advising Chiang Kai-
Shek and Syngman Rhee to restrain themselves and follow the U.S.’s less outwardly militant 
approach to the Cold War, pushing the French to make genuine moves to assure Vietnam’s 
democratic independence, and shoring up support in both Pakistan and Iran.  Whereas Nixon was 
comfortable criticising other governments for what he perceived as shortcomings in 1953, the 
vice president was less apt to heap criticism on the Eisenhower administration.  By the time of 
his 1957 mission to Africa, Nixon was more comfortable placing the blame on American 
shoulders. 
 After his mission to several northern African nations in 1957, the vice president utilised 
the framework of the New Look to underscore the changes that the Eisenhower administration 
                                                          
372
 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Kennedy or Nixon:  Does it Make any Difference? (New York:  The Macmillan Company, 
1960), 4. 
99 
 
ought to make in order to both spread American influence and proactively contain Communism.  
While Nixon did spend time during this mission gauging leaders’ reactions to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, a policy which promised to ensure the independence of Middle Eastern nations 
suffering from Communist interference, and checking on any Communist in-roads, the vast 
majority of the vice president’s time was not focused on either of these topics.  The greater part 
of Nixon’s time was spent exploring how and where America might be able to expand its 
influence in Africa.  The vice president concluded that this was often as simple as increasing aid, 
such as to Morocco, but in other cases Nixon argued that the Eisenhower administration’s 
policies had weaknesses which needed to be addressed.   
Two key weaknesses Nixon noted were the lack of funding and priority given to 
diplomatic posts in Africa, and the seemingly obvious point that sending racist diplomats or 
ambassadors to African posts did nothing to further America’s interests.  Connected to this 
factor, the vice president contended that the Eisenhower administration had to start taking 
tangible steps to eliminate prejudice within the United States to, at the very least, avoid the 
embarrassment such problems caused for the U.S. internationally.  The vice president also 
argued that the Eisenhower administration ought to increase military aid to willing allies, such as 
Ethiopia, in order to maintain a stronger presence not only as a bulwark against encroaching 
Communist advances in Africa, but also to properly equip possible proxies to combat 
Communist or Nasserist manoeuvres in the Middle East.  Significantly, many of Nixon’s 
recommendations were implemented. 
The vice president’s 1958 mission to Latin America served as a dramatic eye-opener for 
both Nixon and the Eisenhower administration.  After learning from labour officials and violent 
protestors that many middle and lower class Latin Americans were not only angered by 
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American policies in the region, but were more and more willing to act on this anger, Nixon 
advocated political and economic changes to the way in which the Eisenhower administration 
dealt with Latin American nations.  The vice president made the point that greater sensitivity on 
the part of the Eisenhower administration to possible reactions to the actions it took in Latin 
America was absolutely essential.  Whether this meant greater consideration of tariffs on Latin 
American goods or resources, no longer granting high honours and safe havens to Latin 
American dictators, or, in the case of the administration’s reaction to the attacks on Nixon, 
avoiding resorting to military intervention, Nixon argued that it was necessary to consider how 
non-elites in nations such as Peru and Venezuela would react.  While Nixon met with resistance 
from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles after the vice president recommended that the 
administration place greater support behind democratically elected governments in Latin 
America, Nixon’s recommendations were still harmonious with the New Look. 
When he travelled to the Soviet Union in 1959, Nixon displayed the nuance and 
sophistication of a seasoned statesman.  The preparations Nixon undertook for this mission 
included everything from exhaustive research to extensive background checks on those who 
would be accompanying him on the mission.  Rather than taking an overtly aggressive approach 
in his debates and arguments with Khrushchev, the vice president conducted himself in a 
diplomatic manner.  Nixon used this approach to glean useful information from Khrushchev, but 
also to challenge the Soviet leader to compete with America not only militarily but economically 
and culturally.  The vice president proposed peaceful competition rather than coexistence as a 
means to ease Cold War tensions.  This proposal was yet one more seldom-utilised component of 
the New Look, as the policy predicted that a domestic drive within the Soviet Union for 
consumer goods, the very thing that would occur with the type of competition Nixon proposed, 
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could result in enough pressure to force Soviet leaders to negotiate more favourably with 
America. 
As he developed as a statesman Richard Nixon advocated policies which would not 
simply contain Communism.  This meant he no longer viewed containing Communism as an end 
unto itself, but came to perceive it as an important aspect of a larger objective.  Certainly 
improving relations with emerging African nations would serve to keep Communism off of the 
continent, but this would also create the opportunity for America to police Africa and parts of the 
Middle East for other unfriendly forces.  Obviously treating Latin American nations like Peru 
and Venezuela with more economic and political respect might decrease the attractiveness of 
Soviet overtures, but by addressing longstanding issues rather than repressing them via dictators, 
where possible, Nixon argued, the Eisenhower administration could create more stable allies and 
remove some of the international tarnish caused by harbouring “refugee dictators.”373  And, 
finally, while the vice president’s mission to the U.S.S. R. demonstrated his anti-Communist 
leanings, Nixon’s theme of exposing the Soviets to the Western world and vice versa, in media 
ranging from television broadcasts, to student exchanges, to consumer goods, meant that 
containment in the strictest sense was clearly not his primary goal. 
Nixon’s role as a statesman was shaped by and in turn helped shape Eisenhower’s foreign 
policies in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War.  From 1953-1959, Nixon’s abilities and opinions as a statesman, Eisenhower’s foreign 
policies, and the Cold War itself, all developed and progressed concurrently.  In 1953, twenty 
years before he ended direct American participation in the wars in Vietnam, Nixon was gaining 
first-hand experience of the conflict and displaying concern over American involvement.  In 
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1959, thirteen years before he became the first president to visit Moscow, Nixon was the first 
vice president to do so, challenging Khrushchev to alter the focus of Cold War competition.  Had 
Nixon never become president, his vice presidency would still stand as an ideal example of the 
complex factors at play during the early stages of the Cold War, and his development as a 
statesmen provides an invaluable resource for perspectives and criticisms of Eisenhower’s 
foreign policies.  Had the vice presidency been as far as Nixon reached in his political career, his 
transformation from an enthusiastic but unsophisticated diplomat to a savvy and astute statesman 
would still be a subject worthy of study.  As Eisenhower’s vice president, Nixon worked to 
promote policies that acknowledged the intricate nature of the Cold War, arguing that in order to 
win the conflict “we need all the weapons – military, economic, and ideological – to fight the 
most complex battle in history.”374 
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